Correspondence between the Hong merchants (as intermediaries of the Viceroy) and Lord Napier, which his lordship would not comply with, was the only mode that could be expected under the existing foreign and Chinese relations. The Viceroy could not set aside that yet unrepealed system, nor enter into personal communication with any foreign representative. To do so, special authority from the Imperial Government was indispensable. The entire difficulty therefore was caused by Her Majesty's representative persisting in requiring of the Viceroy that which the latter could not grant. Naturally, the 'Napier War,' or, as locally called, the 'Napier fizzle,' was the result. It was coupled, too, with an entire stoppage of all foreign trade from September 2 to September 24, which was a very serious thing, and entirely unjustifiable in the absence of a declaration of war. The mortifying result was that Lord Napier had to renounce his expressed determination to remain at Canton. The British Government should either have obtained official recognition from Pekin for their representative, or simply have appointed a Consul whose dignity could not have been infringed upon by his being placed on the same footing as Consuls of other foreign nations.
On September 21 Lord Napier quitted Canton with his suite for Macao. As the frigates proceeded towards the Bogue and Lintin, so did the two chop-boats of Lord Napier, _pari passu_, towards his destination by the inner passage. He was convoyed by several Chinese men-of-war boats. At length his Lordship arrived on the 26th. The humiliating end of his ineffectual attempt to correspond directly with the local government aggravated an illness brought on by the vexation and excitement he had undergone from the day of his landing from the 'Fort William's' boat, and on October 11 his Lordship died at Macao.
The years 1835 and 1836 were unmarked by any event out of the regular course. The business of the house was taking a great extension (purely as agency); but in 1837 occurred the failures in London of three important banking houses having a large American connection. We had negotiated their 'credits' for some of our constituents to a considerable amount for the payment of teas and silks. Those houses were Thomas Wilson & Co., George Wildes & Co., and Timothy Wiggin, commonly known as the three W's. These failures were within a short time of each other. On reference to our register of bills drawn, we found the total amount of which we had not yet received advice of payment or acceptance to be close upon 200,000_l._ They were all drawn on 'clean credits,' without 'collaterals' (which were not yet in vogue), and at six months' sight. We had confidence in our American constituents, but as the shipments occupied, say, four months in getting to market, and could only be sold at the usual credit of six months, very little margin of time existed. Our own credit, however, was the first consideration. One of our partners, then in Boston, had in his charge a very large amount belonging to Houqua, who gave us an order on the former to hold at our disposal any sum required. Enclosing this, we directed remittances to be made to Messrs. Barings of a sufficiency to cover all such bills on the W's as could not be relied upon for payment by those for whose accounts they had been drawn, and simultaneously we informed Messrs. Barings that remittances would be made to them to provide for such bills, so that our signature could be promptly honoured.