Mr. Justice GOLDBERG, with whom Mr. Justice DOUGLAS joins, dissenting.
This Court's decision in the Chicago River case, Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago R. & I.R. Co., 353 U.S. 30, 77 S.Ct. 635, 1 L.Ed.2d 622, holds that strikes are excluded pending grievance proceedings over 'minor disputes' before the Adjustment Board. Though this is all that Chicago River holds, the Court today impliedly reads it to mean and, indeed, there is language in Chicago River to the effect that Congress is to be taken as having elected in favor of a comprehensive and wholly exclusive system of compulsory arbitration and as having outlawed all use of economic force in the form of a strike at any stage of a 'minor dispute' which is subject to consideration by the Adjustment Board. The logic of Chicago River is that 'final and binding' awards of the Adjustment Board are enforceable in favor of, or against, either the employer railroad, the union, or the grievant employee in the federal courts. Given the premises of Chicago River, it must follow that such enforcement proceedings are governed by federal law as declared by this Court in cases such as United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 80 S.Ct. 1343, 4 L.Ed.2d 1403, United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO v. Warrior & Gulf Co., 363 U.S. 574, 80 S.Ct. 1347, 4 L.Ed.2d 1409, andUnited Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise, etc., Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 80 S.Ct. 1358, 4 L.Ed.2d 1424, and, of course, that the merits of such awards are not subject to de novo consideration upon a petition for judicial enforcement. See International Ass'n of Machinists, AFL-CIO v. Central Airlines, 372 U.S. 682, 83 S.Ct. 956.
Here, however, unlike Chicago River, the Adjustment Board proceedings have ended; moreover, we are dealing not with a nonmoney award which is made specifically 'final and binding' by the statute, but with a money award which, as the majority recognizes, is governed by different considerations and is treated differently in the statute itself. A money award by the Board is expressly declared by the Act not to be 'final and binding.' The enforcement machinery contained in subsection (p) of the Act-which the Court's opinion inferentially suggests is confined to money awards, and which I would expressly declare to be so limited contemplates for such awards not that limited type of review applicable to 'final and binding' nonmoney awards, but a de novo trial before the court, subject only to the limitation, as the statute requires, that the findings of fact of the Board shall constitute 'prima facie' evidence. Under such circumstances, the logic of Chicago River in excluding strikes in favor of an exclusive scheme of 'compulsory arbitration' seems to me to have no application, for here we are dealing with nonfinal and nonbinding awards, the direct antithesis of a compulsory arbitration scheme.
In addition, the Court's opinion leads to what seems to me to be a wholly anomalous result plainly never intended by Congress. What was merely expressed as dicta in Union Pac. R. Co. v. Price, 360 U.S. 601, 79 S.Ct. 1351, 3 L.Ed.2d 1460, is apparently reinforced by today's holding. In Price, the Court said, though the question was not before it, that a strike against an Adjustment Board award denying a money claim of a grievant could be enjoined in the federal courts under the rationale of Chicago River. See 360 U.S., at 611, n. 10, 79 S.Ct., at 1357. The Court here holds that a strike to enforce a money award favorable to the claimant is forbidden even when the carrier refuses to abide thereby. In so holding, the Court cites Price with apparent approval and its language supports the result declared by the Price dicta. Thus, as of today, it appears even more clearly that a grievant filing a money claim which is denied by the Adjustment Board is finally bound by the result and may neither bring an independent suit on his claim (the holding of Price ), nor, presumably, utilize economic pressure, i.e., the strike, in support of his claim (the purport of the Price dicta and the thrust of today's holding), nor even seek further judicial review of the merits of his claim since the literal language of subsection (p) applies only to awards in the claimant's favor. The carrier will have no reason to seek further judicial review because the award is favorable to it and both the unsuccessful grievant and the union are without effective means to prevent its enforcement. Thus, under today's opinion and the prior cases cited therein, the grievant whose money claim is denied by the Board is wholly without further remedy or recourse.