On the other hand, it has been repeatedly held that the States may, in the absence of legislation by Congress, enact quarantine laws, even though in effect they thereby regulate foreign commerce; and furthermore that such legislation may be, in the interest of effective enforcement, applied beyond the mere exclusion of diseased persons. Thus in the leading case the State of Louisiana was sustained in authorizing its Board of Health in its discretion to prohibit the introduction into any infected portion of the State of "persons acclimated, unacclimated or said to be immune, when in its judgment the introduction of such persons would add to or increase the prevalence of the disease."[779] At the same time it was emphasized that all such legislation was subject to be supplanted by Congress at any time.

STATE GAME PROTECTION AND FOREIGN COMMERCE

The Constitution of the United States of America: Analysis and Interpretation — Part 164

The Court's tolerance of legal provisions which might not standing alone be constitutional, when they are designed to make legislation within the police power practically enforceable, is also illustrated in connection with State game laws. In the case of Silz _v._ Hesterberg[780] the Court was confronted with a New York statute establishing a closed season for certain game, during which season it was a penal offense to take or possess any of the protected animals, fish or birds; and providing farther that the ban should equally apply "to such fish, game or flesh coming from without the State as to that taken within the State." This provision was held to have been validly applied in the case of a dealer in imported game who had in his possession during the closed season "one dead body of an imported grouse, ..., and taken in Russia." Again the absence of conflicting legislation by Congress was adverted to.[781]

The Constitution of the United States of America: Analysis and Interpretation — Part 164

In Southern Pacific Co. _v._ Arizona,[782] decided in 1945, Chief Justice Stone made the following systematic statement of principles which have guided the Court in the exercise of its power of judicial review of State legislation affecting interstate commerce: "Although the commerce clause conferred on the national government power to regulate commerce, its possession of the power does not exclude all state power of regulation. Ever since Willson _v._ Black-Bird Creek Marsh Co., 2 Pet. 245, and Cooley _v._ Board of Wardens, 12 How. 299, it has been recognized that, in the absence of conflicting legislation by Congress, there is a residuum of power in the state to make laws governing matters of local concern which nevertheless in some measure affect interstate commerce or even, to some extent, regulate it.[783] Thus the states may regulate matters which, because of their number and diversity, may never be adequately dealt with by Congress.[784] When the regulation of matters of local concern is local in character and effect, and its impact on the national commerce does not seriously interfere with its operation, and the consequent incentive to deal with them nationally is slight, such regulation has been generally held to be within state authority.[785]

The Constitution of the United States of America: Analysis and Interpretation — Part 164