When we read in all the papers of the Comp'ny officers killed, We don't stop to think who has to take their place; But if we knew, our hearts with admiration would be filled For the N.C.O. with grim and grimy face.
His language on the barrack square, ain't quite what it should be, And it's probable he likes his whack of beer, But there's nothing like that voice of his, and never yet will be To steady the young soldier when he's feeling "Bullet-queer."
He's ahead in all the rushes, he's the last one to retire, And in battle's got a joke for every one; He doesn't seem to mind a damn, when under Mauser fire, And he don't forget the wounded when the day is fought and won.
Then, Mr. Rudyard Kipling, here's more work for you to do, You've sung of gallant "Tommies" and their deeds, Just write about their N.C.O.'s and give them all their due, For good N.C.O.'s are what the Army needs.
The "Art of War," which, I must confess, is but a feeble equivalent for the _art militaire_ of the French, covers strategy and tactics. In discussing the duties of any particular arm in warfare it is obvious that the discussion must necessarily deal with tactics rather than strategy, which, I take it, will not undergo any great change as long as human nature remains subject to its present limitations. But the arm which I am now discussing has been and will be in the future even more the chief instrument used by a general who wishes to carry out big strategic movements. Wherefore cavalry must, above all things, be mobile, ready to move at the shortest moment, prepared in every respect to carry out quickly the ideas of the commander.
The "strategic arm," as the cavalry has been styled, has been called upon, during the present campaign, to face difficulties which have been almost unknown in former campaigns. First and foremost it has had to operate against an army of mounted infantry, more mobile than itself. Waterless plains, heat, and short rations, have been difficulties which in Europe would be absent. Foreign criticisms on the operations of our cavalry in the present campaign are based on false premises, inasmuch that their authors assume a plentiful supply of water, an equable climate, an easy transport, and a fair amount of supplies. They have not taken into account the fact that our cavalry have had to cut themselves off from all supplies in what, for all practical purposes, is a howling desert, for the English horses have steadily refused to touch the veldt-grass. If there is one criticism on the operations of our cavalry which can in any sense be justified, it is that in many cases we have made it an objective of our movements to charge the enemy. By doing so, we have perhaps sacrificed opportunities of outflanking the Boers for the illusive chance of proving the efficiency of the _arme blanche_ on an enemy, whose only weapon is a rifle. I once heard a distinguished cavalry officer declare that it was his conviction that in a two-mile race, starting fair, the Boer, mounted on his little African pony, would outpace our troopers riding a big English horse and carrying an equipment which reminded him of the picture of Father Christmas. But as over two million people have at different times criticised the weight of cavalry equipment, and nobody, except the Boer, has given us a remedy, we may leave this portion of our subject to lecturer--the U.S. Institute.