Colonel Stone corrects a very common error, which views the whole race of North American Indians as essentially alike--"all as the same roving, restless, houseless race of hunters and fishermen, without a local habitation and with scarce a name." He gives examples of the varieties of Indian character, not less marked than between the English and the French--some following the buffalo in his migrations, others finding a precarious subsistence in the forest chase, others again fishing and trapping; tribes who pass most of their time in canoes, while others, woodland tribes, cultivate the soil, and gradually become organized, and acquire a higher state of civilization, and present a marked difference of character and taste from the hunter and fishermen tribes. "This higher state of social organization among the Six Nations," says Colonel Stone "greatly increased the difference. They had many towns and villages giving evidence of perseverance. They were organized into communities whose social and political institutions, simple as they were, were still as distinct and well-defined as those of the American Confederacy. They had now acquired some arts, and were enjoying many of the comforts of civilized life. Not content with small patches of cleared lands for the raising of a few vegetables, they possessed cultivated fields and orchards of great productiveness at the West. Especially was this the fact with regard to the Cayugas and Senecas. The Mohawks having been driven from their own rich lands (in the valley of the Mohawk and Susquehanna rivers), the extensive domains of the westernmost tribes of the confederacy (in the Genesee country) formed the granary of the whole. And in consequence of the superior social and political organization just referred to, and the Spartan-like character incident to the forest life, the Six Nations, though not the most numerous, were beyond doubt the most formidable of the tribes then in alliance with the Crown. It was justly considered, therefore, that the only way _to strike them effectively would be to destroy their homes_ and the growing produce of their farms, and thus, _by cutting off their means of supply, drive them from their own country deeper into the interior, and perhaps throw them altogether upon their British allies for subsistence_."