The action of mind to which the term _imagination_ is thus restricted differs in no respect from other acts of conception when the mind is under the influence of desire, except in the _nature of the objects of_ _desire_. If it is the desire of the mind to establish a proposition by mathematical reasoning, the mind is engaged in the same process of conception as when it is engrossed with the desire to form some combination of taste. In both cases some object of desire stimulates the mind, and whatever conceptions appear fitted to accomplish this object immediately become vivid and distinct.
The term _judgment_, as a mental faculty, signifies "that power of the mind by which it notices _relations_." It is often used to signify all the intellectual powers, among which it is the most important one. Thus we hear it said that, in certain cases, the _feelings_ and the _judgment_ are in opposition, or that the _heart_ and the _judgment_ are not in agreement.
It is also used often to signify any act of the mind when a comparison is made between two things, or between the truths asserted in any proposition and a truth already believed. The act called _memory_ is a conception attended with one specific act of judgment, by which a present state of mind is compared with a past, and the relation of resemblance perceived.
The nature of our ideas of relation are very different, according to the object or purpose for which the comparison is made. If objects are compared in reference to _time_, we learn some one of the relations of past, present, or future. No idea of time can be gained except by comparing one period of time with another, and thus noticing their relations. All _dates_ are gained by comparing one point of time with some specified event, such as the birth of the Savior, or some particular period in the revolution of the earth around the sun.
If objects are compared in reference to the _succession_ of our conceptions or perceptions, we gain the ideas of such relations as are expressed by the terms _firstly_, _secondly_, and _thirdly_. If objects are compared in reference to the _degree_ of any quality, we gain an idea of such relations as are expressed by the terms _brighter_, _sweeter_, _harder_, _louder_. If objects are compared in reference to _proportion_, we gain ideas of such relations as are expressed by the terms _an eighth_, _a half_. If objects are compared in reference to the relation of parts to a whole, we gain such ideas as are expressed by the terms _part_, _whole_, _remainder_.