The security policy of the Enrique Peña Nieto administration that governed Mexico from 1 December 2012 to 30 November 2018 prioritized the reduction of violence rather than attacking Mexico's drug trafficking organizations head-on, marking a departure from the strategy of the previous six years during Felipe Calderón's administration. Peña Nieto has set up a number of conceptual and organizational changes from the past regime policy, and one of the biggest contrasts is the focus on lowering murder rates, kidnappings, and extortions, as opposed to arresting or killing the country's most-wanted drug lords and intercepting their drug shipments. The government of Calderón, however, has justified its position by stating that the current violence in the country is a necessary stage in Mexico's drug war, as weakening criminal groups fight for territorial control against one another and the government. Moreover, part of Peña Nieto's strategy also consists on the creation of a national police made up of 40,000 members, known as a "gendarmerie." He also proposed on centralizing the sub-federal police forces under one command. The president-elect emphasized that he does not support the involvement or presence of armed U.S. agents in Mexico, but considers allowing the United States to instruct Mexico's military training in counterinsurgency tactics. Beyond that, Peña Nieto promised that no other measures will be taken by the U.S. in Mexico. While campaigning, Peña Nieto appointed a former general of the National Police of Colombia as his external advisor for public security, and boldly promised to reduce 50% of the murder rates in Mexico by the end of his six-year term.
Critics of Peña Nieto's security strategy, however, say that he offered "little sense" in exactly how he will reduce the violence. During the three-month campaign, Peña Nieto was not explicit on his anti-crime strategy, and many analysts wonder whether Peña Nieto is holding back politically sensitive details in his security strategy or simply does not know yet how he will squelch the violence and carry out the next stage in Mexico's drug war. Moreover, U.S. officials were concerned that the return of Peña Nieto's Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) to power may mean returning to the old PRI tactics of "corruption [and] backroom deals" with the cartels in exchange for bribes and relative peace. Peña Nieto later denied that he would negotiate with the cartels.
Security policy
Kingpin strategy
Throughout the administration of Felipe Calderón, the Mexican government argued that the arrests of the top leaders in the drug trafficking organizations did not lead to violence. In a new public campaign, the government released 10 videos that explained the "myths" behind Mexico's drug war, one of them including the so-called "kingpin strategy," which focuses on taking down the drug lords and leaders of the drug cartels. The government's counterargument against critiques was that killing or arresting drug kingpins had no effect on the already rising murder rates in an area. In some cases, however, the government argued that violence went down after a drug kingpin was taken out. The most common critique against the kingpin strategy is that arresting or killing leaders in criminal organizations leaves a leadership void, fracturing the cartels and allowing rival groups to take over the assets of the cartel. The theory is used to explain why violence has spiked in the states of Tamaulipas and Nuevo León, where the arrest of the Gulf cartel's leader – Osiel Cárdenas Guillén – led to the split of the two groups that composed the organization: the Gulf Cartel and Los Zetas. Back in 2010, the state of Chihuahua lived a similar phenomenon with the rupture of the Sinaloa Cartel and the Beltrán Leyva cartel after the military gunned down Arturo Beltrán Leyva, a top leader in the Beltrán Leyva cartel. Calderón has a different interpretation of the situation, however. He argues that taking down the kingpins does not increase the violence in states that are already among the most dangerous in Mexico. By this theory, the army was sent in to restore order in states already plagued with violence; hence, their presence is a product, not a cause, of the rising murder rates.