1. The jurisdiction of this court to review the judgment of the court of appeals is questioned. There is no money in dispute nor anything to which a pecuniary value has been given. Jurisdiction is claimed under the clause of § 8 of the act of February 9, 1893 [27 Stat. at L. 436, chap. 74 U.S.C.omp. Stat. 1901, p. 573], which gives an appeal to this court from the final judgment or decree of the court of appeals in cases in which there is drawn in question the validity of 'an authority exercised under the United States.'
By § 483 of the Revised Statutes (U.S.C.omp. Stat. 1901, p. 272), the Commissioner of Patents, subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, is empowered to establish from time to time regulations not inconsistent with law, for the conduct of proceedings in the Patent Office. The Commissioner of Patents, exercising the power conferred, established, among other rules of practice, rule 41. It thereby became a rule of procedure, and constituted, in part, the powers of the primary examiner and Commissioner. In other words, it became an authority to those officers, and, necessarily, an authority 'under the United States.' Its validity was and is assailed by the plaintiff in error. We think, therefore, we have jurisdiction, and the motion to dismiss is denied.
2. The issue is well defined between the parties, both as to the right and remedy, in the Patent Office. As to right, petitioner contends that a union by an inventor of process and apparatus claims, which are essentially the same invention, is given by the patent laws, and that rule 41, so far as it takes that right away, is repugnant to those laws, and invalid. As to remedy, that the decision of the primary examiner constituted a final decision upon the case, and petitioner was entitled to an appeal under the patent laws to the board of examiners-in-chief. The latter proposition depends upon the first. Assuming the right in an inventor as expressed in the first proposition, the primary examiner denied the right. True, a distinction can be made between his ruling and one on the merits, if we regard the merits to mean invention, novelty, or the like. But in what situation would an applicant for a patent be? If he yield to the rule he gives up his right of joinder. If he does not yield he will not be heard at all, and may subsequently be regarded as having abandoned his application. Section 4894, Rev. Stat. (U.S.C.omp. Stat. 1901, p. 3384). A ruling having such effect must be considered as final and appealable. Whether, however, to the examiners-in-chief or to the Commissioner, and from the latter to the courts, we may postpone answering until we have considered the right of an inventor to join process and apparatus claims in one application.
Section 4886 of the Revised Statutes of the United States (U.S.C.omp. Stat. 1901, p. 3382), provides as follows:
'Any person who has invented or discovered any new and useful art, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvements thereof, not known or used by others in this country before his invention or discovery thereof, and not patented or described in any printed publication in this or any foreign country before his invention or discovery thereof, or more than two years prior to his application, and not in public use or on sale in this country for more than two years prior to his application, unless the same is proved to have been abandoned, may, upon payment of the fees required by law, and other due proceeding had, obtain a patent therefor.'
There is nothing in the language of the section which necessarily precludes the joinder of two or more inventions in the same application. But the section does distinguish inventions into arts (processes), machines, manufactures, and compositions of matter, and the earliest construction of the law denied the right of joinder. An exception, however, came to be made in cases of dependent and related inventions.
In Hogg v. Emerson, 6 How. 437, 12 L. ed. 505, it was said:
'The next objection is, that this description in the letters thus considered covers more than one patent and is therefore void.
'There seems to have been no good reason at first unless it be a fiscal one on the part of the government when issuing patents, why more than one in favor of the same inventor should not be embraced in one instrument, like more than one tract of land in one deed or patent for land. Phillips, Patents, 217.
'Each could be set out in separate articles or paragraphs, as different counts for different matters in libels in admiralty or declarations at common law, and the specifications could be made distinct for each, and equally clear.