Within a brief time Cullen received deputations from both branches of the Sioux informing him that they neither could nor would comply with his demands unless United States soldiers were sent with them. He communicated the demand to Major Sherman, then commanding at Fort Ridgely, who replied that soldiers could not be furnished for such an undertaking since there was not a sufficient number then at the post to make it advisable to spare any; and "the policy of sending soldiers to co-operate with Indians ... would only expose troops to treachery on the part of the Indians." Then, too, "a body of Indians on an expedition of that kind would rely on troops to do the work of capturing and killing ... in case they should have an engagement with the party they were seeking".[327]

Admitting the soundness of this answer Superintendent Cullen informed the Indian envoys that United States troops could not be furnished for such a purpose, and he stated that unless the Indians decided to undertake such an expedition alone and unaided, other measures than those already taken would be resorted to from necessity. No further action coming from the Indians, Superintendent Cullen determined to withhold the annuities.[328]

The Spirit Lake Massacre — Part 134

On the thirteenth the Indians again declined to go in pursuit of Inkpaduta without the aid of United States troops. On the fourteenth they began consolidating their bands and it became evident to all that trouble was afoot. Matters were growing more critical every day. The whites became alarmed and began to leave their farms. Many fled to the post or left the country altogether. The situation reached a climax on the evening of the fifteenth when a Sisseton, without provocation, stabbed a soldier of Major Sherman's command. The Indian escaped and fled to the Sisseton camp where he was received and protected. This incident evidenced the determination of these Indians to protect rather than punish law-breakers.[329]

The Spirit Lake Massacre — Part 134

The crisis was made more acute by the demand for the release of the Indian to the military authorities. Major Sherman made the demand and was refused. The officer sent by him was received "with two hundred of their guns pointed towards him". Delivery of the culprit was, however, promised for the next morning. At that time "they came down from their lodges, numbering about twenty-five hundred warriors, all armed and painted, evidently prepared for fight. Many surrounded and came into the camp; they asked a council".[330] They were told that their request could not be granted until they surrendered the culprit and laid their guns aside. By deceit they then sought to draw out the Indian agents and army officers one by one to talk, with the intention of killing them when they had been drawn into a council. In this plan they were frustrated, and on the following day they surrendered the culprit. The Indians were probably emboldened by the panic which then existed throughout the whole of southern and western Minnesota. They construed the situation as "an open confession of cowardice, fear and weakness" upon the part of the Indian and military authorities, and they were ready to flout both at any opportunity.[331]

The Spirit Lake Massacre — Part 134