Art. VII. "This arrangement does not apply to the points now occupied by Spain on the Moorish shore of the Mediterranean.
Art. VIII. "The two Governments, animated by their sincerely friendly sentiments for Spain, take into particular consideration the interests she possesses, owing to her geographical position and to her territorial possessions on the Moorish shore of the Mediterranean, in regard to which the French Government will make some arrangement with the Spanish Government ... (which) will be communicated to the Government of His Britannic Majesty."
These Articles apply to Ceuta, which Spain withheld from the Portuguese after the brief union of the crowns in the sixteenth century; to Veléz, an absolutely worthless rock, captured in 1564 by Garcia de Toledo with fifteen thousand men, the abandonment of which has more than once been seriously urged in Spain; to Alhucemas, a small island occupied in 1673; to Melilla, a huge rock peninsula captured, on his own account, by Medina Sidonia in 1497; and to the Zaffarine (or Saffron) Islands, only one of which is used, in the seizure of which the French were cleverly forestalled in 1848. All are convict stations; unless heavily fortified in a manner that at present they are not, they would not be of sufficient value to tempt even a foe of Spain. Ceuta and Melilla alone are worthy of consideration, and the former is the only one it might ever pay to fortify.
So far have matters gone. The conference asked for by Morocco--the flesh thrown to the wolves--is to form the next Act. To this conference the unfortunate Sultan would like to appeal for protection against the now "free hand" of France, but in consenting to discuss matters at all, she and her ally have, of course, stipulated that what has been done without reference to treaty shall not be treated of, if they are to take part, and as an act of courtesy to us, the United States has followed suit. Other matters of importance which Mulai Abd el Azîz desired to discuss have also been ruled out beforehand, so that only minor questions are to be dealt with, hardly worth the trouble of meeting.
Foremost among these is the replenishing of the Moorish exchequer by further loans, which might more easily have been arranged without a conference. Indeed, there are so many money-lenders anxious to finance Morocco on satisfactory terms, that the competition among them has almost degenerated into a scramble. But all want some direct guarantee through their Governments, which introduces the political element, as in return for such guarantee each Power desires to increase its interests or privileges. Thus, while each financier holds out his gold-bags temptingly before the Sultan, elbowing aside his rival, each demands as surety the endorsement of his Government, the price of which the Sultan is hardly prepared to pay. He probably hopes that by appealing to them all in conference, he will obtain a joint guarantee on less onerous terms, without affording any one of them a foothold in his country, should he be unable to discharge his obligations. He is wise, and but for the difficulties caused by the defection of England and France from the political circle, this request for money might alone have sufficed to introduce a reformed _régime_ under the joint auspices of all. As it is, attempts to raise funds elsewhere, even to discharge the current interest, having failed, his French creditors, who do possess the support of their Government, have obligingly added interest to capital, and with official sanction continue to roll the snowball destined one day to overwhelm the State. In the eyes of the Moors this is nothing less than a bill-of-sale on the Empire.