STATE OF ARIZONA, Plaintiff, vs. JAMES ARTHUR RAY, Defendant.
CASE NO. V 13000R201080049
February 3, 2011
Hon. Warren Darrow
DIVISION PTB
DEFENDANT JAMES ARTHUR RAY'S RESPONSE TO STATE'S MOTION IN LIMINE RE: WITNESS RICK ROSS
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
I. INTRODUCTION
By highlighting Rick Ross's criminal history and violent and unlawful "professional" practices, the State's motion in limine forcefully underscores the reasons Ross should be excluded as an expert witness. See Defendant's Motion in Limine No. 9 to Exclude Testimony of Rick Ross (filed Jan. 24, 2011). As the Defense has noted, the State's attempt to call Ross as an expert on the psychological effects of self-help seminars threatens this trial's integrity. Ross is strikingly unqualified to offer expert testimony; he lacks education or training in any mental health field, has a history of lawbreaking, and is a self-proclaimed "activist" with a highly controversial agenda. Moreover, Ross's inflammatory "conclusions" lack any connection to the evidence in this case.
If this Court denies Mr. Ray's motion and permits Ross to testify as an expert, the Constitution's Sixth Amendment and Due Process Clause require the Court to allow Mr. Ray full and complete cross-examination regarding Ross's qualifications, conclusions, and credibility. "The right of confrontation, which includes the right to cross-examine witnesses, is a fundamental right." State v. Correll, 148 Ariz. 468, 473 (Ariz. 1986) (citing and quoting Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403-04 (1965)). Moreover, years of Arizona case law emphasize that "[t]rial courts must give great latitude for full and complete cross-examination of expert witnesses." Gasiorowski v. Hose, 182 Ariz. 376,381 (App. 1995). A complete cross-examination here includes the categories the State seeks to cordon off: Ross's dubious and unlawful professional activities and his criminal history. These facts bear on Ross's qualifications as an expert, the reliability of his opinions, and the bias of his testimony. The State cannot restrict cross-examination into these vital matters simply because some of these facts—all of which are admitted on Ross's own website—are inconvenient or embarrassing. "The State could ... protec[t]" Ross "from exposure" of this information in court "by refraining from using him to make out its case." Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 320 (1974). But "the State cannot, consistent with the right of confrontation," require Mr. Ray to forego questioning that will allow the jury to "appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of Mr. Ross and his purported expert opinions. Id. The State's motion must be denied.
II. ARGUMENT
"`Whether rooted directly in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or in the Compulsory Process or Confrontation Clauses of the Sixth Amendment, the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants 'a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense."' Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 789-90 (2006) (quoting Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 324, (2006)). In particular, the Constitution's Sixth Amendment guarantees defendants the right to confront witnesses against them through cross-examination, which is 'one of the safeguards essential to a fair trial."' Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404 (1965). The cross-examination right includes the ability to "revea[1] possible biases, prejudices, or ulterior motives of the witness." Davis, 415 U.S. at 316. And because the right to complete cross-examination of adverse witnesses is "so vital a constitutional right," id. at 320, it is reversible error for a trial court to bar a defendant from "expos[ing] to the jury the facts from which jurors, as the sole triers of fact and credibility, could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness." Id. at 318.