The Afghans cannot, of course, be expected to understand the principle of party-government at home; the defeat of the Conservative party and the recall of Lord Lytton put an end to such ideas as the retention of Candahar and the maintenance of the scientific frontier. Our change of policy was misunderstood generally in Afghanistan, where, to this day, it is believed we were too weak to carry out our original plans.
The Mustaufi, Habibulla Khan, who was sent by General Roberts some weeks ago to negotiate with the Ghazni malcontents, and induce them to state what their demands really were, has returned to Sherpur and reported that he has the majority of the chiefs now at Maidan, and they are willing to attend a Durbar. Young Musa Khan has, however, been left at Ghazni with Mushk-i-Alam. When General Roberts first proposed to Habibulla Khan to go to Ghazni, and sound the temper of the malcontent leaders, with a view to arrange some basis upon which the settlement of Afghanistan could be carried out, the answer was that it would be useless—the irreconcilables would not listen to him. There the matter ended for the time being, but some weeks afterwards the Mustaufi voluntarily visited the General, and said that he was willing to go to his home in Wardak, whence he could judge if it were possible to gather the tribal chiefs together for purposes of consultation. He accordingly set out, and for the past two months we have heard strange rumours of what was happening in Wardak and Ghazni. The Mustaufi now reports that, on arriving at his home in Wardak, he fell ill, and for some time was unable to do anything in the way of negotiation. Upon recovering, he began to sound the various Wardak chiefs as to their views, and was careful to point out the folly of resistance, now that the British had received large reinforcements and had strengthened Sherpur and the heights above Cabul. At first, no one would listen to him, so he proceeded to Ghazni to interview Mahomed Jan, young Tahir Khan (half-brother of Hashim Khan), and finally Mushk-i-Alam. Here also he met with but little success: Mahomed Jan would not adopt his views, but talked of a new _jehad_, and the driving of the British out of the country: the success of the first few weeks of December was to be repeated on a larger scale, and every tribesman was to rise from Ghazni to Jellalabad. Against such tall talk the Mustaufi could only urge that the _jehad_ would come to as bitter and humiliating an end as the previous one had done on December 23rd, when the force sent to attack Sherpur had been beaten off with great loss. Then Mahomed Jan veered round slightly, and said he would abandon all idea of fighting if Yakub Khan were reinstated, or Musa Khan created Amir. The former scheme, he was told, was impossible; the latter might possibly be considered. The Mustaufi was much hindered in his work by young Tahir Khan, who had Musa Khan in his keeping. This young sirdar cordially hates his half-brother, Hashim Khan; and as he knew Habibulla was working solely in the latter’s interest, he tried to thwart him in every way. This game of cross-purposes would have been most interesting to an outsider if all the intricacies of the intrigues could have been understood; but it must sorely have tried the temper of the Mustaufi, who had everything to gain by bringing the malcontents to look at matters from his point of view. He was, however, more than a match for a drunken debauchee, such as Mahomed Jan and an inexperienced youth like Tahir Khan. Turning his attention to Mushk-i-Alam, he used different arguments to those employed with the military leaders of the disaffected. He showed to the old _moollah_ that the only way of getting rid of the infidels (whom he hated just as much as any reckless fanatic) was by negotiation, and not by resistance: the former course might put Cabul once more into a position of importance; the latter only could result in disaster to Afghanistan, as the British forces were daily growing in strength, and it was fully intended to capture Ghazni from the Candahar direction, and punish every tribe showing overt hostility. The _moollah_ was half-convinced, and was left in such a frame of mind that good results might be looked for. Then Habibulla Khan turned his attention to the powerful chiefs of his own tribe, and by means which we are ignorant of, won them all over to his side. They, perhaps, scented future rewards and great power in the direction of the State when their kinsman should be Finance Minister of a new Amir, and they announced themselves as prepared to consult with the British upon the subject of a future Government. The example of the Wardak chiefs was contagious, and soon the Logar _maliks_ made common cause with them.