Now all these people are in a sense unfree, while yet in some other sense they are free. Let us then spend a short while in discussing the various meanings that freedom may have in a legal classification of the sorts and conditions of men. When we have put out of account the rightless slave, who is a thing, it still remains possible to say that some men are unfree, while others are free, and even that freedom is a matter of degree. But we may use various standards for the measurement of liberty.
Perhaps in the first place we shall think of what German writers call _Freizügigkeit_, the power to leave the master whom one has been serving. This power our ancestors would perhaps have called 'fare-worthiness[125].' If the master has the right to recapture the servant who leaves his service, or even if he has the right to call upon the officers of the state to pursue him and bring him back to his work, then we may account this servant an unfree man, albeit the relation between him and his master has been created by free contract. Such unfreedom is very distinct from rightlessness. As a freak of jurisprudence we might imagine a modern nobleman entitled to reduce by force and arms his fugitive butler to well-paid and easy duties, while all the same that butler had rights against all the world including his master, had access to all courts, and could even sue for his wages if they were not punctually paid. If we call him unfree, then freedom will look like a matter of degree, for the master's power to get back his fugitive may be defined by law in divers manners. May he go in pursuit and use force? Must he send a constable or sheriff's officer? Must he first go to court and obtain a judgment, 'a decree for specific performance' of the contract of service? The right of recapture seems to shade off gradually into a right to insist that a breach of the contract of service is a criminal offence to be punished by fine or imprisonment.
Then, again, there may seem to us to be more of unfreedom in the case of one who was born a servant than in the case of one who has contracted to serve, though we should note that one may be born to serve without being born rightless.
More to the point than these obvious reflections will be the remark that in the thirteenth century we learn to think of various spheres or planes of justice. A right good in one sphere may have no existence in another. The rights of the villeins in their tenements are sanctioned by manorial justice; they are ignored by the king's courts. Here, again, the ideas of freedom and unfreedom find a part to play. True that in the order of legal logic freedom may precede royal protection; a tenure is protected because it is free; still men are soon arguing that it is free because it is protected, and this probably discloses an idea which lies deep[126]:--the king's courts, the national courts, are open to the free; we approach the rightlessness of the slave if our rights are recognized only in a court of which our lord is the president.