Carlo-francoism (, also carlo-franquismo) was a branch of Carlism which actively engaged in the regime of Francisco Franco. Though mainstream Carlism retained independent stand, many Carlist militants on their own assumed various roles in the Francoist system, e.g. as members of the FET y de las JONS executive, Cortes procuradores, or civil governors. The Traditionalist political faction of the Francoist regime issued from Carlism particularly held tight control over the Ministry of Justice. They have never formed an organized structure, their dynastical allegiances remained heterogeneous and their specific political objectives might have differed. Within the Francoist power strata, the carlo-francoists remained a minority faction that controlled some 5% of key posts; they failed to shape the regime and at best served as counter-balance to other groupings competing for power.
In Spanish the term appears in scientific narrative, though it is mostly used as a derogatory designation intended to stigmatize and abuse; the related name of carlofranquistas has filtered out from Spanish historiography and public discourse into the English academic language. Alternative terms used are “carlistas colaboracionistas”, “carlistas unificados”, “carlismo franquista”, “tradicionalistas pro-franquistas”, “pseudotradicionalistas franquistas”, “carlo-falangistas”, “carlo-fascistas”, "tradicionalistas del Movimiento", “tacitistas” or "carloenchufistas", usually highly abusive and disparaging. There is no obvious corresponding but non-partisan term available.
Background
Carlism, the movement born in the 1830s, during the following 100 years became known for rigid, die-hard, adamant stand – by supporters hailed as virtuous principled consistency and by opponents ridiculed as backwater fanaticism – rather than for political compromise and give-and-take alliances. The movement has always prided itself in totally independent, unaligned status. At different points in time it absorbed various political groupings, like the so-called apostólicos in the 1830s or the so-called neocatólicos in the 1860s, rather than joined alliances with others. In fact, periodically surfacing temptations to form broad coalitions were usually quashed and resulted in secessions, like in case of the so-called pidalistas in the 1870s or the so-called mellistas in the 1920s. Even mild and provisional attempts to co-ordinate political strategy within the monarchist camp generated enormous internal resistance and were eventually abandoned, like in case of the so-called TYRE in the mid-1930s.
Until the late 19th century the Traditionalists viewed the army as a backbone of godless state, ravaged by liberalism, masonry and secularism; this approach started to change in the 1880s. While highly suspicious of other parties and unwilling to engage in political trade-offs, since the late 19th century Carlism was increasingly looking towards the military as to a potential partner on the path towards seizing power. Encouraged by the rise of Boulangism in France, they started to hope for a general who would be prepared to carry out a conservative coup d’état; in such case, they were ready to lend him their support. Throughout the next few decades these speculations focused on a few individuals, like Polavieja, Weyler, Primo de Rivera or Sanjurjo. In most cases these schemes eventually failed, though in the early summer of 1936 the Carlists managed to close a vague and ambiguous deal with general Emilio Mola, chief engineer of the military anti-Republican conspiracy; the agreement sealed their access to the military coup of July 1936.