In general it may be said that there are only two sources out of which 48 an increase of wages can be paid, and these are the profits of the business organizer and manager or the increased product of the business itself, and of these two only the latter can serve as a permanent source of higher wages. Now it is pretty evident that labor has not been in a position to force the trust magnates to forego their profits. On the other hand, wages in industries carried on by industrial combinations have risen, and it must therefore have been because there was more produced and consequently more to be divided. If the inefficient workers were discharged and only the best ones retained by the trusts, here is one explanation why they could afford to pay high wages--they paid more because they got more done. As yet labor has not admitted that it is unable to cope with these industrial combinations; it has however demanded that it be allowed to combine on a national scale and to bargain collectively for united labor with combined capital.
The discussion of the effects of trusts upon the consumer leads at once to the discussion of their effects upon prices, for it is through the agency of price that the trust touches the ordinary man. The advantages claimed by trust organizers are economies of production and lowered cost; but the vital question to the consumer is whether lowered cost increases profits or reduces prices. On this point the Industrial Commission reaches the following conclusion: “that in most cases the combination has exerted an appreciable power over prices, and in practically all cases it has increased the margin between raw materials and finished products. Since there is reason to believe that the cost of production over a period of years has lessened, the conclusion is inevitable that the combinations have been able to increase their profits.” Moreover the power over prices was greatest during certain periods when the control of the combinations was greatest. The problem therefore resolves itself into the question, 49 are trusts monopolies? While a categorical answer cannot be given to this, it may safely be affirmed that all trusts try to be monopolies. Nor is it necessary to control the production, sale, or purchase of a commodity absolutely in order to exercise monopoly power; the control of 50 or 60 per cent may suffice to secure virtual monopoly. The purpose of a monopoly is so to fix the price that it will obtain the maximum net profit. It is conceivable that this result may be attained by lowering the monopoly price below the point of the competitive price, but this is unusual. In general a monopoly price has meant a high price, and a high price has meant a restriction of the output. Where that has been the result of trust control, society has been injured, for not only has it not shared in the economies of production but it actually gets less and has to pay more than it would have done under competition. It may be said, however, that even in the case of the greatest monopoly there is always the specter of potential competition threatening its profits, while the possibility of substituting some other commodity for the monopolized article protects the consumer from too great extortion and keeps the price within limits. Absolute control over price is never exercised by any monopoly. Nevertheless, we may fairly conclude, in the words of Henry D. Lloyd, that “monopoly is business at the end of its journey,” control over prices is the object of combination.