WOLFE:--What hindered you then, sir, from executing that which appeared to you so easy?
MONTCALM:--We attempted it, but with very bad success. Seven days after your landing at the Pointe Levis, Mr. Dumas, Major of the Colony troops, was sent to attack your camp at the Pointe Levis, with a body of fifteen hundred men, who, in the night, crossed the river St. Lawrence at Quebec, without being discovered by your advanced guards. But they were no sooner landed and marching, than, struck with a panic, the utmost disorder suddenly ensued; their heads turned, and, losing their senses entirely, they fired at each other, believing themselves attacked by your army. In short, they immediately fled back to their boats with the greatest precipitation and confusion. Discouraged by this bad beginning, M. de Vaudreuil would never listen to any proposals of further attempts upon your camps; and it was decided to keep ourselves for the future upon the defensive.
WOLFE:--It appears to me, however, that you were not encamped in a proper manner to be upon the defensive. Your army did not amount to ten thousand men, and your camp extended seven or eight miles.
MONTCALM:--I agree with you, and am sensible that the longer the line, the weaker it is in its several parts. I am convinced that it is impossible to prevent a line from being forced; and I believed likewise that, landing on a coast where there are several leagues of it to be defended, equally susceptible of descent, is the same case as lines. He who attacks has all his force concentrated at a single point, which he may choose as he pleases; anywhere in the extent of his lines; on the contrary, he who is attacked in his entrenchments has his force divided over the whole extent of his lines, and does not know on what part of them the enemy has the intention to make his real attack, so that he must be everywhere equally strong and guarded over all the ground occupied by his army. Thus the head of a column of a great depth of ranks must infallibly pierce through lines who have only at most two or three men deep; and by feint attacks all over the front of a line, you cannot weaken one part of it by drawing troops from it to fortify another part of it, unless the point of the enemy's principal attack is manifestly known. It is certainly the same with regard to landings, where all the extent of the sea coast may be threatened at the same time, although it is a common opinion that a coast may be defended, and that an enemy may be repulsed in his attempt to make a descent by open force.