As the matter in dispute does not reach the jurisdictional sum or value, it is contended that this court has jurisdiction to entertain the writ of error, because 'the validity of an authority exercised under the United States' was drawn in question in the case. 23 St. p. 443, c. 355. The claim of the relator arises under the last clause of section 2 of the act of March 3, 1835, entitled 'An act re gegulate the pay of the navy of the United States,' (4 St. pp. 755, 757, c. 27,) which reads: 'It is hereby expressly diciared that the yearly allowance provided in this act is all the pay, compensation, and allowance that shall be received, under any circumstances whatever, by any such officer or person, except for traveling expenses, when under orders, for which ten cents per mile shall be allowed.' By section 273 of the Revised Statutes it is provided that 'it shall be the duty of the second comptroller First, to examine all accounts settled by the second, third, and fourth auditors, and certify the balances arising thereon to the secretary of the department in which the expenditure has been incurred; second, to countersign all warrants drawn by the secretaries of war and of the navy, which shall be warranted by law.' And by section 277: 'The duties of the auditors shall be as follows: * * * Fifth. The fourth auditor shall receive and examine all accounts accruing in the navy department or relative thereto, and all accounts relating to navy pensions; and after examination of such accounts, he shall certify the balances, and shall transmit such accounts, with the vouchers and certificate, to the second comptroller, for his decision thereon.' Section 236 provides: 'All claims and demands whatever by the United States or against them, and all accounts whatever in which the United States are concerned, either as debtors or as creditors, shall be settled and adjusted in the department of the treasury.' By the act establishing the offices of comptroller and auditor, the former was authorized and required 'to superintend the adjustment and preservation of the public accounts,' and 'to examine all accounts settled by the auditor;' and it was made the duty of the latter 'to receive all public accounts, and, after examination, to certify the balance, and transmit the accounts, with the vouchers and certificate, to the comptroller, for his decision thereon.' 1St. 66. Considering the accepted definition of an'a uditor' with the language used in these provisions, the fourth auditor may be correctly said to be authorized to examine accounts accruing in the navy department, compare the items with the vouchers, allow or reject charges, and state the balance; and the comptroller has authority to revise the action of the auditor, are certify the balances finally found by him. It is stated in the opinion delivered by Mr. Chief Justice WAITE, in U.S. v. Graham, 110 U.S. 219, 220, 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 582, cited on behalf of relator, that it was found as a fact in that case 'that on the 6th of April, 1835, which was only a little more than a month after the act of 1835 passed, circular instructions were issued from the treasury department to the effect that mileage at the rate of 10 cents a mile was fixed by law, and should be paid for traveling expenses within the United States, but that the usual and necessary passage money actually paid by officers returning from foreign service, under orders or on sick ticket, when they could not return in a public vessel, would be paid as theretofore, as well as the like expenses of officers going out. The navy regulations adopted in 1865, and in force in 1872, when the claim of Graham, the appellee, accrued, provided that 'for traveling out of the United States the actual expenses only are allowed.' It is also found that from the time of the passage of the act of 1835 until the decision of Temple's Case, (in this court,) the navy and treasury departments had, with a single exception, always held that the 10 cents a mile did not apply to travel to, from, or in foreign countries, but only to travel in the United States. In Temple's Case the long continued practice in the departments was relied on to justify the decision of the accounting officers of the treasury against him, but the fact of the actual existence of the practice was not found as it has been now.' The decision in U.S. v. Temple, 105 U.S. 97, was announced at October term, 1881.