_Lieutenant Barry_: “I would go forward and join my two platoons at the enemy strong point.”
_The Director_: “Would you take any other action before doing that?”
_Lieutenant Barry_: “I think not, sir. I would want to know the situation up there as soon as possible.”
_The Director_: “What would you do, Lieutenant Hunt?”
_Lieutenant Hunt_: “I would send a messenger back to the 3rd platoon to get started on its way to the captured position.”
_The Director_: “Just how would you do that?”
_Lieutenant Hunt_: “I would turn to the runner of the 3rd platoon, who is with me and tell him:
“‘Take this message to the leader of the 3rd platoon: ‘The 3rd platoon will report to Captain C at the enemy strong point at once, moving by the shortest route.’
“I would have the runner repeat the message and make sure that he, himself, understands what is wanted.”
_The Director_: “You are right. There is no doubt but that the presence of the 3rd platoon will be required at the enemy position just as soon as it can be gotten up there. The assault platoons will be more or less disorganized by their attack. They will be out of hand. Squads, sections and platoons will be mixed up. There will be some hand to hand fighting with some of the enemy who have failed to make their get-away or with some determined men who will hold on to their local position until they are driven out with cold steel.
“It is to provide for just such a situation as this, that we hold out a reserve—a formed body of troops that has not been in the assault. A body that is absolutely in hand and under control. It can be conducted up to the enemy position, take it over and be ready for any eventuality that may occur.
“As a matter of fact the assault troops should not be allowed to go into the captured position unless it is absolutely necessary to do so to drive out or capture those remaining. The reasons for this are obvious. When the enemy abandons the position, he assumes that it is occupied by his opponent and will turn as great a volume of fire on it as possible with a view to inflicting losses on our disorganized troops. With a formed body of troops, under control, we can make such tactical distribution of the units as may be required, posting them where the greatest amount of shelter exists and thereby reduce casualties to a minimum.”