The above tables present quite an interesting pitching problem, the puzzle being to find out which of the above pitchers did the best work in the box in every respect, not only in pitching, but by his batting, fielding and base running. In percentage of victories pitched in, Meekin took the lead. In the number of batsmen struck out, Rusie excelled. In fewest bases on balls, Staley had the lowest figures. In base hit averages, Stivetts led; while in total sacrifice hits, Breitenstein bore off the palm. In total runs scored, Stivetts had the largest total. In stolen bases, Kennedy was the most successful, and yet he only stole 5 in 42 games.
Now the problem is, Which pitcher did the best average work in his position? and we leave that for our readers to solve.
It is alleged that the reason pitchers do so little in stealing bases is that they are too fatigued in their pitching in each inning to do much in the active work of base running, both duties trying a player's nerves considerably. For this reason it would be a good plan, in the order of batting, to have a sure hitter follow each pitcher, so as to help bat him round.
We are glad to record the fact that scientific pitching is advancing in the League arena. Its progress, hitherto, has been slow and only step by step, but it is making headway, and during 1894 the science of strategic pitching made greater progress than ever before. The effective blow given to "cyclone" pitching by the new pitching rules, which went into effect in 1893, while it did not materially affect the strategic class of pitchers--some of whom the new rules actually benefited--obliged the class of pitchers who depend solely upon their dangerous speed for success, to adopt strategic tactics to a more or less extent; and this is why a few of the old "cyclone" pitchers--as they are called--succeeded better than they anticipated under the change made in the rules in 1893, which had placed them farther from the batsman than in 1892.
It may be said, in connection with the pitching of 1894, that one thing noticeable in the "box" work of that season was that the brainy class of men in the position began to pay more attention to the advice of the theorists of the game than before; and thereby they learned to realize the fact that _strategic skill, and that equally important attribute, thorough control of temper_, together with the avoidance of the senseless _kicking habit_ in vogue, had more to do with success in their position than they had previously been aware. Those of the pitching fraternity who read up on the subject of skill in pitching, were told that the primary elements of strategic work in the "box" included: "First, to deceive the eye of the batsman in regard to the character of the delivery of the ball, as to its being fast or slow. Second, to deceive his judgment in reference to the direction of the ball when pitched to him, as to its being high or low, or where he wants it. Third, to watch the batsman closely so as to know just when he is temporarily 'out of form' for making a good hit; and Fourth, to tempt him with a ball which will be likely to go high from his bat to the outfield and be caught."