JUDGMENT DEBTOR, in English law, a person against whom a judgment ordering him to pay a sum of money has been obtained and remains unsatisfied. Such a person may be examined as to whether any and what debts are owing to him, and if the judgment debt is of the necessary amount he may be made bankrupt if he fails to comply with a bankruptcy notice served on him by the judgment creditors, or he may be committed to prison or have a receiving order made against him in a judgment summons under the Debtors Act 1869.
JUDGMENT SUMMONS, in English law, a summons issued under the Debtors Act 1869, on the application of a creditor who has obtained a judgment for the payment of a sum of money by instalments or otherwise, where the order for payment has not been complied with. The judgment summons cites the defendant to appear personally in court, and be examined on oath as to the means he has, or has had, since the date of the order or judgment made against him, to pay the same, and to show cause why he should not be committed to prison for his default. An order of commitment obtained in a judgment summons remains in force for a year only, and the extreme term of imprisonment is six weeks, dating from the time of lodging in prison. When a debtor has once been imprisoned, although for a period of less than six weeks, no second order of commitment can be made against him in respect of the same debt. But if the judgment be for payment by instalments a power of committal arises on default of payment for each instalment. If an order of commitment has never been executed, or becomes inoperative through lapse of time, a fresh commitment may be made. Imprisonment does not operate as a satisfaction or extinguishment of a debt, or deprive a person of a right of execution against the land or goods of the person imprisoned in the same manner as if there had been no imprisonment.
JUDICATURE ACTS, an important series of English statutes having for their object the simplification of the system of judicature in its higher branches. They are the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1873 (36 & 37 Vict. c. 66) and the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1875 (38 & 39 Vict. c. 77), with various amending acts, the twelfth of these being in 1899. By the act of 1873 the court of chancery, the court of queen's (king's) bench, the court of common pleas, the court of exchequer, the high court of admiralty, the court of probate and the court of divorce and matrimonial causes were consolidated into one Supreme[1] Court of Judicature (sec. 3), divided into two permanent divisions, called "the high court," with (speaking broadly) original jurisdiction, and "the court of appeal" (sec. 4). The objects of the act were threefold--first, to reduce the historically independent courts of common law and equity into one supreme court; secondly, to establish for all divisions of the court a uniform system of pleading and procedure; and thirdly, to provide for the enforcement of the same rule of law in those cases where chancery and common law recognized different rules. It can be seen at once how bold and revolutionary was this new enactment. By one section the august king's bench, the common pleas, in which serjeants only had formerly the right of audience, and the exchequer, which had its origin in the reign of Henry I., and all their jurisdiction, criminal, legal and equitable, were vested in the new court. It must be understood, however, that law and equity were not fused in the sense in which that phrase has generally been employed. The chancery division still remains distinct from the common law division, having a certain range of legal questions under its exclusive control, and possessing to a certain extent a peculiar machinery of its own for carrying its decrees into execution. But all actions may now be brought in the high court of justice, and, subject to such special assignments of business as that alluded to, may be tried in any division thereof.