The notice of attack was received "with surprise," but was met with a characteristic move. "I raised the question with him"--the counsel--"as to what possible motive" his client "had in the matter," the "trustee" testifies, "and as to whether it would not be better for him to desist from it; whether it would not be possible for us, if he was needing business, to find some position in which he could legitimately earn a living."[322] The lawyer replied that he had no right to treat on any such basis, and withdrew from all connection with the case. But this was the opening of a negotiation which through another lawyer "resulted," as the expert of the State afterwards confessed, "in peace between us." He had given notice that he meant to attack, and the "negotiation" which followed "was whether anybody would give me as much as there was in my contract with the State if I would not attack."[323]
Meanwhile the Attorney-General marched gayly to another defeat of his client--the people--going into court with no other ammunition than the facts furnished by the men he was suing. He did not put his expert, nor the Auditor-General, nor his assistant, nor the men on whose information and affidavits the estimate had been made of taxes due, nor any one else on the stand. He was "perfectly satisfied," he says, "that these facts were true," and that the company were "in good faith doing exactly what they undertook to do--namely, to furnish me with all the information that was necessary to establish the Commonwealth case."[324]
His method was as singular with the argument as with the testimony. He insisted, in opposition to the opinion of Auditor-General Schell, that such a corporation must pay taxes on all its capital stock, whether it represented property in the State or out of it. The court decided against him. It held that it was taxable "only on so much of its capital stock as was represented by the business and property of the company within the State." As to what the amount of this property and business within the State was the court took the facts furnished by the delinquent itself, as they were the only ones presented to it by the Attorney-General. The amount originally charged for taxes by Auditor-General Schell, who had forced the fighting, was $3,145,541.64. The Attorney-General, on his mistaken theory of the law and on the facts volunteered by those he was suing, had "split the difference" and sued for only $796,642.20. The court cut this down to $33,270.59, and on appeal this was still further reduced to $22,660.10.[325]