Mosaic depicting scenes of the Soviet–Mongolian friendship, Zaisan memorial, Ulaanbaatar. Photo by Lo van den Berg via Flickr (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0) The second week of October 2022 was marked in Mongolia by the grand opening of the Chinggis Khaan Museum in the capital Ulaanbaatar, dedicated to the founder of the Mongol empire, the largest contiguous land empire in history. Around the same time, Mongolians marched in front of the Russian embassy to protest against its bloody invasion of Ukraine, calling for the expulsion of the Russian ambassador Iskander Azizov. The head of the Russian diplomatic mission, the longest serving ambassador to Mongolia with almost nine years of service, has been accused of interfering with internal affairs of the state and impeding the development of energy projects. In January 2022, the public expressed outrage at the Russian ambassador’s request to the chairman of the State Great Khural (parliament), to hand him the issues and directions to be discussed in the spring sessions of the parliament. Indeed, a conspicuous disregard for the country’s sovereignty and diplomatic protocol, which often took the form of undisguised pressure, became the pattern of the Russian–Mongolian relations in recent years. Already, in 2011, Mongolia’s extreme dependence on energy imports from Russia, which amounted to 90 percent of overall petroleum products imports, was regarded as a major risk and vulnerability, especially since Russia made a habit of cutting oil and diesel exports, causing price hikes. With the launch of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, when European countries try to withstand Putin’s policy of “energy blackmail” by diversifying energy sources or suppliers, Mongolia still remains extremely dependent on Russian imports in general and energy resources in particular. As of March 2022, Russian–Mongolian trade amounted to almost a third of Mongolia's total imports, more than any country in the Caucasus and Central Asia (except Armenia and Kazakhstan, both of which are the members of the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU)). A train station at the Russian–Mongolian border, Naushki, Russia. Photo by Clay Gilliland via Flickr (CC BY-SA 2.0) Once dubbed “an oasis of democracy” by the then US Secretary of State John Kerry, the landlocked nation of Mongolia stood alone between its two authoritarian neighbors — Russia and China. Despite scoring low in the fields of official corruption and inequality, Mongolia was rated by Freedom in the World as “Free,” with an overall score of 85 out of 100. However, Mongolia, whose economy grew at the impressive rate of 17 percent in 2011, found itself at the verge of default in 2016, struggling with debt and losing foreign investments. At the same time, almost a third of the population was below the poverty line, leaving the government in dire need of foreign investment and new economic opportunities. It was around this time that both Russia and China intensified their ambitious economic and geostrategic projects: the so-called “Russia’s pivot to Asia,” (“поворот на Восток” or “Pivot to the East” in Russian), and China's Belt and Road initiative (BRI). However, unlike BRI, that was presented as a global infrastructure endeavor with Europe as one of its integral parts, Putin’s Pivot to the East was primarily driven by anti-Western sentiments following the imposition of sanctions on Russia after it annexed Crimea in 2014. Traditionally, Mongolia tried to benefit from the competition between Russia and China, the only countries it borders. However, as Russia become more dependent on China after 2014, the possibilities of balance within the tripartite system rapidly diminished. Mongolian politics have been dominated since 2017 by two influential figures, both of whom happened to be great admirers of the Russian president Vladimir Putin. In July 2017, Khaltmaagiin Battulga, a former world champion wrestler and the president of the Mongolian Judo Association, was elected president of Mongolia. The populist politician from Democratic Party (DP) and self-made millionaire ardently presented himself as a pro-Kremlin and, eventually, anti-Beijing candidate, as well as a friend of the Russian president, with whom, as he often emphasizes, he shares a love for judo. The admiration for Putin seemed to be the core of his election campaign, as he officially used the campaign slogan “A president like Putin” (Путин шиг ерөнхийлөгч), and allegedly used in his campaign photoshopped images depicting him with Putin.