The two expressions "There _is_ such a thing as so and so" and "So and so is real" are certainly sometimes and quite naturally used as equivalents, even if they are not always so used. And Mr. Bradley's own language implies that this is so. For, as we have seen, in the first passage, he seems to identify belonging to reality with being real. The conclusion which he expresses in one place by saying that Time does not belong to reality he expresses in another by saying that it is not real; whereas in the second passage he seems to identify the meaning of the same phrase "belonging to reality" with _existing;_ he says that whatever exists must belong to reality, and that it is self-contradictory to deny this. But if both being real and existing are identical with belonging to reality, it would seem they must be identical with one another. And, indeed, in another passage in the Appendix to the 2nd Edition (p. 555) we find Mr. Bradley actually using the following words: "Anything," he says, "that in any sense _is,_ qualifies the absolute reality and so is real." Moreover, as we have seen, he declares it to be nonsense to deny that Time _is_; he must, therefore, allow that, _in a sense,_ at all events, it is nonsense to deny that Time is real. And yet this denial is the very one he has made. Mr. Bradley, therefore, does seem himself to allow that the word "real" may, _sometimes_ at all events, be properly used as equivalent to the words "exists," "is a fact," "is." And yet his two assertions cannot both be true, unless there is _some_ sense in which the whole proposition "Time is real" is _not_ equivalent to and cannot be inferred from "Time is," or "Time exists," or "Time is a fact."
It seems, then, pretty clear that Mr. Bradley must be holding that the statement "Time is real" is in _one_ sense, _not_ equivalent to "Time exists"; though he admits that, in _another_ sense, it is. And I will only quote one other passage which seems to make this plain.
"If," he says later on (p. 206) "Time is not unreal, I admit that our Absolute is a delusion; but, on the other side, it will be urged that time cannot be mere appearance. The change in the finite subject, we are told, is a matter of direct experience; it is a fact, and hence it cannot be explained away. And so much of course is indubitable. Change is a fact and, further, _this fact, as such,_ is _not_ reconcilable with the Absolute. And, if we could not in any way perceive how _the fact_ can be _unreal,_ we should be placed, I admit, in a hopeless dilemma.... But our real position is very different from this. For time has been shown to contradict itself, and so to be appearance. With this, its discord, we see at once, may pass as an element into a wider harmony. And with this, the _appeal to fact_ at once becomes worthless."