The betting is now resumed. In regular order it would be for B (the Age) to start it, but he has the privilege, if he so pleases, of "holding the age," _i.e._ reserving his stake till the other players have had their say.[38] C, therefore, is the first to declare. His cards are worthless, and he decides to pass out. { 128} D has but a moderate hand, for two pairs may easily be beaten. On the other hand, they frequently win, and it would be foolish to show the white feather until he knows a little more about the hands of his adversaries. He goes five counters. E, as we have seen, has nothing. He has two alternatives, either to go out and sacrifice what he has already staked, or to endeavour to drive others out by a false pretence of strength. Deciding for the latter alternative, he not only makes good D's stake, but goes ten better, as though he held a capital hand. A has already passed out; and it is, therefore, B's turn. He has "threes," a much more than average hand, and far too good to be driven out of the field without a struggle. Under such circumstances two alternatives are open to him. He may simply make good the last raise, and say, "I'll see you" (in which case all turn up their cards, and, having the better hand, B wins the pool), or he may be inclined to speculate a little further. He makes good the raise, and goes five better. C, it will be remembered, has already passed out; and D, inferring from the persistence of E and B that they hold pretty strong hands, thinks discretion the better part of valour, and goes out also. The battle is now solely between B and E. B has a good hand, and E has nothing; but if he is a bold player, he may still win. B's last raise, which was to only half the limit, tends to indicate that he has not a _very_ strong hand, and perhaps a little "bluffing" (as the betting upon a worthless hand is called) may frighten him out of the field. Accordingly, E not only makes good B's raise, but again goes the _maximum_ (ten) better. Unless E has the reputation (a very undesirable one) { 129} of a habitual bluffer, B will probably begin to feel alarmed. E's repeated raises, coupled with the fact that he only drew one card--a sign of a pretty strong hand--suggest that he holds probably fours, if not a "full," "sequence," or "flush," either of which would put B out of the running. He is again confronted with the same alternatives--viz. to make good E's raise and see him (in which case B would win); to go better, which seems hazardous; or to pass out, thereby avoiding the necessity of making good the last raise. If he is a timid player, he may possibly (either at this stage or later) adopt the latter course, in which case E takes the pool _without showing his cards_, thereby concealing the fact that they were worthless. This privilege is very important, for "bluffing" is an essential part of the game of Poker, and to bluff with success depends mainly on the adversaries' ignorance of the habitual tendencies of the player in this particular. If a player is known to be in the habit of bluffing, he does so at a great disadvantage. The man who can bluff most successfully is the steady-going player with whom high stakes are the usual indication of good cards. When such a one begins to "plunge," the other players are apt to place themselves in the position of the coon sighted by the crack marksman in the American story, "Don't fire; I'll come down." Obviously, to expose the cards on which a player has been steadily raising all competitors, and reveal the fact that, instead of the expected "full," or "flush," there is not even a solitary "pair" among them, would tend heavily to discount the effectiveness of the same player's bluffing in a subsequent round. Hence the { 130} rule of not showing the cards in such a case, which is always adhered to.