On April 1, 1902, the United States commenced this action in the circuit court of the United States for the district of Minnesota to recover for injuries charged to have been done through the negligence of the Davidson Steamship Company to a government breakwater at Two Harbors, Lake Superior. The defendant answered, denying the negligence, and alleging that the result was due to the negligence of the government, the plaintiff. No question was made as to the amount of the injury. Trial was had before a jury, which returned a verdict for the government. Judgment thereon was entered by the circuit court. This judgment was affirmed by the circuit court of appeals for the eighth circuit (73 C. C. A. 425), and from that court brought here on writ of error.
In a general way, the facts are that on the night of July 24, 1901, the steamer Shenandoah, the property of the steamship company, ran into the government breakwater at Two Harbors, Minnesota. Agate bay, Lake Superior, is the harbor of the village of Two Harbors, and is an open bay, across the mouth of which there are breakwaters extending from either shore, running in an easterly and westerly direction, and leaving an open space as an entrance to the iron ore and other docks in the bay. The breakwater extending from the easterly side had been constructed for a number of years, extending into the bay for a distance of about 750 feet, and its outer end indicated in the nighttime by a fixed, large red light, 15 or 20 feet high. In 1899 the government projected an extension of this breakwater of about 300 feet in length, and at an angle of 45 degrees from the original breakwater. At the time of the injury this extension, composed of wooden cribs filled with stone, had been carried to its full length, but not built up to its intended height, and, in fact, rising only a few inches above the surface of the water. On the extreme outward end of the new extension was a mast or pole about 12 feet high, and on it was hung an ordinary white light or lantern. The original fixed red light on the old breakwater had been moved back some 30 feet, in order that the new work could be properly joined to the old.
On the evening named the Shenandoah loaded a cargo of iron ore at Superior, Wisconsin, and proceeded to Two Harbors, to take in tow a barge that was being loaded there. When the vessel left Superior the night was dark and stormy and the sky covered with clouds, with a heavy wind blowing from the northeast, making a high sea. Arriving off Two Harbors at about 11 o'clock, the steamer headed for the entrance, intending to enter port, as she had formerly done, close to the easterly breakwater. When she had approached within about 200 feet the surf was seen breaking over the extension of the breakwater. Her engines were promptly stopped and reversed, but, notwithstanding this, she struck this extension about 125 feet from the fixed red light, and did considerable damage to it, but without injury to herself. The port of Two Harbors is on the north side of Lake Superior, about 27 miles from Duluth, and one of the most important iron ore loading points on the Great Lakes.
Now, whether the injury was the result of negligence, and which party was guilty, of negligence, are questions of fact properly determinable by a jury. These questions are the only ones discussed by counsel for the steamship comapny, and therefore to them alone we direct our attention. It is true in the assignment of errors some other matters are named, but they are not called to our attention in brief or argument, and an examination of them shows that very properly counsel for the steamship company considered them not sufficiently important to justify any discussion.
It is well, before noticing the testimony, to consider the extent to which our inquiry may properly go. The settled rule is that where negligence is a mere question of fact, and nothing appears which is negligence per se, the determination of the question is peculiarly the province of a jury, and its conclusions will not be disturbed unless it is entirely clear that they were erroneous. Courts do not approach the question as an original one, and consider whether, in their judgment, the testimony does or does not prove negligence, but accept the determination of the jury, if there is any evidence upon which it can be rested. This is the general rule in respect to all mere questions of fact. Authorities in this court, as well as in others, are abundant and clear on this point. It is sufficient to refer to one or two.