[248] CO 1stMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 0815 27 Jun 51.

General Thomas gave his opinion of the patrol base concept after his retirement when he summed it up as “an invitation to disaster.”[249] He could only carry out orders, however, when Corps directed early in July that a patrol base be established on Taeu-san.

U.S. Marine Operations in Korea 1950-1953 Volume IV (of 5) — Part 133

[249] Gen G. C. Thomas interv, 6 Feb 58. It is interesting to note that there was no mention of the patrol base concept in the then current _Field Service Regulations, Operations, FM 100-5_, published by the Department of the Army in August 1949.

U.S. Marine Operations in Korea 1950-1953 Volume IV (of 5) — Part 133

This 4,000-foot peak, located some 2 miles north of the MLR, afforded excellent observation eastward into the Punchbowl and westward into the So-chon River Valley. The enemy, of course, was aware of these advantages and had made Taeu-san a strongpoint of his MLR. This was clearly indicated by the stiff resistance encountered by KMC reconnaissance patrols.[250]

U.S. Marine Operations in Korea 1950-1953 Volume IV (of 5) — Part 133

[250] Unless otherwise specified, the remainder of this section is based on 1stMarDiv _HD_, Jul 51, 7–11; Col C. W. Harrison’s account, “KMC Attack on Taeu-san, 8-11 July 1951;” Col G. P. Groves, ltr of 9 Apr 58.

Nevertheless, Division G-3 was suddenly alerted on the morning of 7 July by the Marine Liaison Officer with X Corps to expect an order directing the setting up of a patrol base on Taeu-san the following day. The KMC Regiment, warned by telephone, had little time for planning and organizing an attack. Since the KMCs could not be relieved for responsibility for their sector, it was necessary to form a composite battalion of the three companies that could most conveniently be relieved. Unfortunately, they contained a large proportion of recruits, and the battalion commander was a new arrival.

There were two avenues of approach. One was along an open, fairly level, ridgeline that extended from the KMC positions. The other called for a descent into the stream-bed generally paralleling the MLR and a steep climb up a ridge leading directly north to Taeu-san.

Both routes of approach were used. One company advanced on the right by way of the stream bed and two companies took to the ridgeline on the left. The assault was to have been preceded by air strikes and an artillery bombardment, but bad weather kept the aircraft grounded.