This is a suit to annul, and enjoin the enforcement of, an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission prescribing joint rail and water and rail water and rail rates (both hereinafter designated as rail and water rates) on cotton from points in Oklahoma, via Galveston and certain steamship lines, to New England destinations. The complaint before the Commission was brought by the Houston Cotton Exchange and Board of Trade and other similar organizations against appellants and a number of other carriers, to have prescribed and established just and reasonable joint through rates on cotton from Oklahoma points through Texas ports to various points of destination in the northeastern part of the United States and Canada, including New England territory. The modified final order of the Commission required appellants to establish and maintain for the transportation of cotton from Oklahoma points, via Galveston and the lines of the Mallory Steamship Company and the Southern Pacific Company-Atlantic Steamship Lines, to destinations in New England territory, joint rail and water rates not exceeding 'rates 4 cents per 100 pounds lower than the present all-rail rates from and to the same points,' not, however, lower than $1.50 per 100 pounds. Prior to the Commission's order, no joint rail and water rates on cotton were in effect between the points mentioned. The rate to New York consisted of the local rail rate to Galveston, plus the water rate therefrom and a loading charge. To New England points, the rate was made by adding the rail rate beyond New York. The all-rail routes from Oklahoma to the New England territory points are through St. Louis, Memphis, and other Mississippi crossing; and the joint all-rail rates were lower to New England destinations than the combination of local rail and water rates. On commodities other than cotton, joint rail and water rates were in effect, and these were lower than the all-rail rates. The Commission found that the establishment of joint rail and water rates on cotton between the points in question was desirable in the public interest, and that the existing rates for such transportation were unreasonable to the extent that they exceeded or may exceed rates constructed by the deduction of 4 cents from the present all-rail rates. 87 Interst. Com. Com'n R. 392; 93 Interst. Com. Com'n R. 268. The court below, consisting of three judges, after a hearing, entered a decree dismissing the bill for want of equity. (D. C.) 6 F.(2d) 888.
Appellants assign 21 specifications of error; but the objections to the Commission's order, so far as necessary to be considered here, may be summarized as follows: (1) The Commission undertook to equalize rail and water rates with the all-rail rates, a power which it does not possess; (2) if the order be treated as made under the power to fix reasonable rates, it is arbitrary and without supporting evidence; (3) the result of the order is to short-haul appellants' lines, contrary to paragraph 4, § 15, of the Interstate Commerce Act, as amended by section 418 of the Transportation Act 1920, c. 91, 41 Stat. 456, 485 (Comp. St. § 8583); and (4) the order is based upon paragraph 13 of section 6, added to the Interstate Commerce Act by the Panama Canal Act of August 24, 1912, c. 390, 37 Stat. 560, 568 (Comp. St. § 8569), and is therefore void because the authority of the Commission was not invoked under that paragraph.
