Altogether it is a bad look-out for Europe.

[3] Since this was written the mark has fallen far beyond.

Where Are We Going? — Part 88

The Charleville speech[4] and M. Poincaré's reply to Lord Curzon's despatch[5] leave things exactly where they were. Rumour said the reply would be long and logical. For once rumour hath not lied. M. Poincaré regards this exchange of bolstered notes as a pillow fight which he is quite prepared to prolong in order to gain time whilst the real struggle is developing to its destined end. The prominence given in the press to the fact that this rigid reply is "courteous" is significant of the pitiable condition to which the Entente has been brought by these maladroit negotiations.

Where Are We Going? — Part 88

What will Mr. Stanley Baldwin and Lord Curzon do next? Much depends for Europe on that next step, and something for them also hangs upon their action or inaction. One is reminded of the answer given by Émile Ollivier to the question addressed to him as to his opinion of one of Napoleon the Third's experiments in constitutional government: "Si c'est une fin, vous êtes perdu; si c'est un commencement, vous êtes fondé." That sage comment is equally applicable to the Curzon note.

Where Are We Going? — Part 88

We can only "wait and see," first for the French official reply, and second for the decision of the British Government upon that note. The only new factor in the situation that may have a determining influence on events is the accession of Herr Stresemann to the German Chancellorship.[6] I know nothing of him beyond newspaper report, but he is generally supposed to be a man of energy, courage and resource. If that be true, his appointment to the official leadership of the German people may be an event of the first magnitude. We shall soon know what he is made of. Germany has suffered more from weak or misguided leadership in recent years than any great country in the world. It blundered her into the War, it blundered through the War, it blundered into the armistice, it blundered during the peace negotiations, and it has blundered her affairs badly after the peace. But no one can predict what Germany is capable of with a wise and strong leadership. Herr Stresemann has a responsibility cast upon him and an opportunity afforded him such as have not been given to any statesman since the days of Stein and his coadjutors for regenerating his country and lifting her out of the slough of despond in which she has been sinking deeper and deeper. Those who ignore the effect which powerful and magnetic personalities may have upon the fortunes of nations in despair must have forgotten their history books. The fall of Dr. Cuno and the rise of Herr Stresemann may well turn out to be a more decisive event than the despatch or the publication of the Curzon note. But if he lacks those rare qualities which alone can inspire a people in an emergency to heroic action and endurance, then there is nothing but chaos ahead of Germany. For the moment it is more important to keep a discerning eye on Herr Stresemann than to watch this endless fencing between Downing Street and the Quai d'Orsay.