JOUFFROY, JEAN (c. 1412-1473), French prelate and diplomatist, was born at Luxeuil (Haute-Saône). After entering the Benedictine order and teaching at the university of Paris from 1435 to 1438, he became almoner to Philip the Good, duke of Burgundy, who entrusted him with diplomatic missions in France, Italy, Portugal and Castile. Jouffroy was appointed abbot of Luxeuil (1451?) bishop of Arras (1453), and papal legate (1459). At the French court his diplomatic duties brought him to the notice of the dauphin (afterwards Louis XI.). Jouffroy entered Louis's service, and obtained a cardinal's hat (1461), the bishopric of Albi (1462), and the abbacy of St Denis (1464). On several occasions he was sent to Rome to negotiate the abolition of the Pragmatic Sanction and to defend the interests of the Angevins at Naples. Attached by King Louis to the sieur de Beaujeu in the expedition against John V., count of Armagnac, Jouffroy was accused of taking the town of Lectoure by treachery, and of being a party to the murder of the count of Armagnac (1473). He died at Reuilly the same year.

See C. Fierrille, _Le Cardinal Jean Jouffroy et son temps_ (1412-1473) (Coutances, Paris, 1874).

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JOUFFROY, THÉODORE SIMON (1706-1842), French philosopher, was born at Pontets, near Mouthe, department of Doubs. In his tenth year, his father, a tax-gatherer, sent him to an uncle at Pontarlier, under whom he commenced his classical studies. At Dijon his compositions attracted the attention of an inspector, who had him placed (1814) in the normal school, Paris. He there came under the influence of Victor Cousin, and in 1817 he was appointed assistant professor of philosophy at the normal and Bourbon schools. Three years later, being thrown upon his own resources, he began a course of lectures in his own house, and formed literary connexions with _Le Courrier français_, _Le Globe_, _L'Encyclopédie moderne_, and _La Revue européenne_. The variety of his pursuits at this time carried him over the whole field of ancient and modern literature. But he was chiefly attracted to the philosophical system represented by Reid and Stewart. The application of "common sense" to the problem of substance supplied a more satisfactory analytic for him than the scepticism of Hume which reached him through a study of Kant. He thus threw in his lot with the Scottish philosophy, and his first dissertations are, in their leading position, adaptations from Reid's _Inquiry_. In 1826 he wrote a preface to a translation of the _Moral Philosophy_ of Stewart, demonstrating the possibility of a scientific statement of the laws of consciousness; in 1828 he began a translation of the works of Reid, and in his preface estimated the influence of Scottish criticism upon philosophy, giving a biographical account of the movement from Hutcheson onwards. Next year he was returned to parlement by the _arrondissement_ of Pontarlier; but the work of legislation was ill-suited to him. Yet he attended to his duties conscientiously, and ultimately broke his health in their discharge. In 1833 he was appointed professor of Greek and Roman philosophy at the college of France and a member of the Academy of Sciences; he then published the _Mélanges philosophiques_ (4th ed. 1866; Eng. trans. G. Ripley, Boston, 1835 and 1838), a collection of fugitive papers in criticism and philosophy and history. In them is foreshadowed all that he afterwards worked out in metaphysics, psychology, ethics and aesthetics. He had already demonstrated in his prefaces the possibility of a psychology apart from physiology, of the science of the phenomena of consciousness distinct from the perceptions of sense. He now classified the mental faculties, premising that they must not be confounded with capacities or properties of mind. They were, according to his analysis, personal will, primitive instincts, voluntary movement, natural and artificial signs, sensibility and the faculties of intellect; on this analytic he founded his scheme of the universe. In 1835 he published a _Cours de droit naturel_ (4th ed. 1866), which, for precision of statement and logical coherence, is the most important of his works. From the conception of a universal order in the universe he reasons to a Supreme Being, who has created it and who has conferred upon every man in harmony with it the aim of his existence, leading to his highest good. Good, he says, is the fulfilment of man's destiny, evil the thwarting of it. Every man being organized in a particular way has, of necessity, an aim, the fulfilment of which is good; and he has faculties for accomplishing it, directed by reason. The aim is good, however, only when reason guides it for the benefit of the majority, but that is not absolute good.

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