Stengart v. Loving Care Agency, Inc., 990 A.2d 650 (2010) was a New Jersey Supreme Court case that provided guidance to employees as to what extent they may expect privacy and confidentiality in personal e-mails composed on company-owned computers. Through its decision, the court ruled on two key issues which concluded that there should be a "reasonable" expectation of privacy in personal e-mails on company computers, and that attorney–client communication privileges and privacy should not be violated. On March 30, 2010, Chief Justice Stuart Rabner and the New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's decision by overturning the previous ruling made by the trial court. The trial court previously determined that a company-created policy provided sufficient warning to employees that all communications and activities performed on company-owned computers were subject to review by the employer and that there should be no expectation of privacy because of such policies.

Prior history of the case

The Plaintiff, Marina Stengart was a former employee of Loving Care Agency, Inc. who provided care services for children and adults. In December 2007, Marina Stengart resigned from her position at Loving Care due to gender discrimination issues, which ultimately led to an action against Loving Care Agency, Inc. Just prior to her resignation, Stengart wrote several e-mails to her lawyer from her personal, password-protected e-mail account using a company-owned laptop. In preparation for the action being taken by Stengart, Loving Care Agency, Inc. hired a computer forensics expert to create a forensics disk image of the hard drive in the computer used by Stengart while employed with the company.

Stengart v. Loving Care Agency, Inc.

During discovery, the plaintiff was made aware of Loving Care's possession of the e-mails from the company-owned laptop that Stengart used. Upon learning of the acquisition of the e-mails by Loving Care, Stengart's attorney, Donald Jacobs filed a motion in Bergen County court for all e-mails to be returned and that copies be destroyed. Mr. Jacobs' motion was denied, and the trial court held that Loving Care's use of the e-mails would be permitted in court. Mr. Jacobs' motion was denied by the trial judge on the basis that such e-mails were not protected by client-attorney privilege because the company's policy indicated that the e-mails were a part of the company's property.

Stengart v. Loving Care Agency, Inc.

Unsatisfied with the trial judge's decision to allow the e-mails to remain with the defendant, Stengart and her attorney decided to present their case to the New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division. The appellate judge subsequently reversed the decision of the trial court by saying that the trial court had not exhibited proper respect to attorney–client privacy, and thereby ordered that the case be heard in front of a judge in the Chancery Division. Furthermore, the appellate court also warned that Loving Care's counsel could have sanctions imposed upon them for violating the attorney–client privileges and obtaining copies of e-mails that they did not have rights to. Once again however, the decision of the court was challenged, but this time by Loving Care Agency. After the decision was made by the appellate court, Loving Care Agency then decided to take the case to the New Jersey Supreme Court for the final ruling.

Stengart v. Loving Care Agency, Inc.

New Jersey Supreme Court decision

During the New Jersey Supreme Court's hearing of the case, the court set out to determine whether or not Loving Care's computer use policy was sufficient notice that her privacy should be expected while using the company-owned laptop. After hearing the facts of the case and reviewing the previous holdings from the lower courts, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision previously made by the appellate court that Marina Stengart had reasonable expectations that her attorney–client communications would remain private. The decision of the court was formed on the basis of a few principles: (1) that Loving Care's policy was "ambiguous" and did not specify that personal, password-protected e-mails were subject to company review, (2) that reasonable expectation of privacy could have been created due to the company's allowing of "personal use" of the computer, and (3) that company interests cannot infringe on attorney–client privileges. In addition to the faults in the wording of the company's policy, the New Jersey Supreme Court also pointed out faults in the company's ideas as to what the company can and cannot do. In this case, the court re-emphasized the importance of respecting attorney–client privileges and warned Loving Care's attorneys that by reading the e-mails, they were in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct.