I do not think it can. I think it is plain that he has in his mind something more than _any_ of these alternatives, or than all of them taken together. And I think so partly for the following reason. He speaks from the outset as if he intended to tell us what _distinguishes_ true ideas from those which are not true; to tell us, that is to say, not merely of some property which belongs to all our true ideas; nor yet merely of some property, which belongs to none but true ideas; but of some property which satisfies _both_ these requirements at once--which both belongs to all our true ideas, and _also_ belongs to none but true ones. Truth, he says to begin with, means the agreement of our ideas with reality; and he adds "as falsity their disagreement." And he explains that he is going to tell us what property it is that is meant by these words "agreement with reality." So again in the next passage which I quoted: "True ideas," he says "are those that we can assimilate, validate, corroborate and verify." But, he also adds, "False ideas are those that we cannot." And no one, I think, could possibly speak in this way, who had not in his head the intention of telling us what property it is which _distinguishes_ true ideas from those which are not true, and which, therefore, not only belongs to all ideas which are true, but also to none that are not. And that he has this idea in his head and thinks that the property of being "useful" or "paying" is such a property, is again clearly shown by a later passage. "Our account of truth," he says (p. 218) "is an account of truths in the plural, of processes of leading, realised _in rebus_, and having only this quality in common, that they _pay." Only_ this quality in common! If this be so, the quality must obviously be one, which is _not_ shared by any ideas which are _not_ true; for, if true ideas have any quality in common at all, they must have at least one such quality, which is _not_ shared by those which are _not_ true. Plainly, therefore, Professor James is intending to tell us of a property which belongs both to _all_ true ideas and _only_ to true ideas. And this property, he says, is that of "paying." But now let us suppose that he means by "paying," not "paying _once_ at least," but, according to the alternative he suggests, "paying in the long run" or "paying for some time." Can he possibly have supposed that these were properties which belonged _both_ to all true ideas _and also_ to none but true ones? They may, perhaps, be properties which belong to _none but_ true ones. I doubt, as I have said, whether the latter does; but still it is difficult to prove the opposite. But even if we granted that they belong to _none but_ true ones, surely it is only too obvious that they do _not_ fulfil the other requirement--that they do _not_ belong to nearly all true ones. Can anyone suppose that _all_ our true ideas pay "in the long run" or repeatedly for some time? Surely it is plain that an enormous number do not for the simple reason that an enormous number of them _have no run at all,_ either long or short, but occur but once, and never recur. I believe truly that a certain book is on a particular shelf about 10.15 p.m. on December 21st, 1907; and this true belief serves me well and helps me to find it But the belief that that book is there at that particular time occurs to no one else, and never again to me. Surely there are thousands of useful true beliefs which, like this, are useful but once, and never occur again; and it would, therefore, be preposterous to say that every true idea is useful "in the long run" or repeatedly for some time. If, therefore, we supposed Professor James to mean that "paying in the long run" or "paying repeatedly over a considerable period" were properties which belonged to all true ideas and to none but true ones, we should be supposing him to mean something still more monstrous than if we suppose him to mean that "paying at least once" was such a property.