ON motion to amend a decree of this court affirming a decree of the Court of Claims, stay, mandate, &c. The case was thus:
Adams filed, some time since, a petition in the Court of Claims against the United States, claiming $112,748 for certain mortar-boats, tug-boats, cabins, pilot-houses, and other work, furnished by order of General Fremont in the Western Military District, during the summer of 1861. One of the defences relied on by the United States against it was, that the government had appointed a board of commissioners to hear and determine this claim among others; that in December, 1861, the petitioner had presented it before that board, who after having heard the same, adjusted his accounts, and awarded a balance due him of $95,655, which he had been paid by the government, giving a receipt for the sum in full of all demands. It was not denied by himself that he had received this money; nor by the government that he had received it only under protest.
The Court of Claims gave a decree in favor of his claim, and the United States appealed.
A rule of this court regulating appeals from the Court of Claims prescribes, in respect to the way in which that court shall prepare and certify its record to this court for review, that it make 'a finding of the facts in the case, and the conclusions of law on the facts on which the court founds its judgment or decree; the finding of the facts and the conclusions of law to be stated separately, and certified to this court as part of the record.' In accordance with this rule the Court of Claims, on the appeal by the United States from its decree, did find and certify as part of the record, the facts; stating among them 'that in December, 1861, the petitioner presented to said commission his claim for said mortar-boats, tug-boats, cabins, &c., in two accounts, setting forth the same.'
The appeal was elaborately and ably argued at the last term by Mr. Hoar, Attorney-General, and Mr. Dickey, then Assistant Attorney-General, for the government-they arguing that the settlement and receipt of the money upon the basis of a quantum meruit (which they endeavored to show was the basis on which Adams had received his money), precluded the assertion of the claim made in the Court of Claims-and by Messrs. Carpenter, Carlisle, Corwine, and Wills, contra; who contended that the receipt which had been given, was no bar to the claim.
This court on the appeal reversed the judgment of the court below, giving an opinion which can be seen in the report of the case in 7th Wallace. The main ground of that opinion was thus presented:
'In the view we have taken of the case, the giving of this receipt is of no legal importance. The bar to any further legal demand against the government does not rest upon this acquittance, but upon the voluntary submission of the claims to the board; the hearing and final decision thereon; the receipt of the vouchers containing the sum or amount found due to the claimant; and the acceptance of that amount under an act of Congress providing therefor.'
The court, in that opinion, agreed that the creditors of the government were not bound to present their claims before that board, but might withhold them, and, as the Secretary of War had refused to recognize them, seek relief before Congress or the Court of Claims.
The counsel of Adams-now filing his affidavit to the effect that the finding of fact sent up by the Court of Claims, as part of the case, was not true, but was erroneous; that the petitioner did not present his claim before that board, but, on the contrary, that the accounts were referred to it by General Meigs, at the head to the bureau, before whom this class of accounts had to be presented for adjustment; that it was heard ex parte; and that the materiality of this fact had been discovered since the delivery of the opinion, above mentioned, of this court reversing the judgment of the Court of Claims-moved to amend the decree of this court, reversing the decree of the Court of Claims; and to stay the mandate, in order to enable Adams to obtain a correction of the record from that court, and that the cause might be again heard.
The ground of this motion was, of course, that the record from the Court of Claims was erroneous in a material fact stated in it, and upon which it was supposed that this court mainly placed its judgment of reversal.