Three questions have been presented on the argument of this appeal:--
1. Whether Congress has the constitutional power to confine the jurisdiction of this court on appeals in admiralty to questions of law arising on the record;
2. Whether, upon the bill of exceptions, the court below erred in refusing to find certain facts which, as is claimed, were established by uncontradicted evidence, and in finding others which had no evidence at all to support them; and,
3. Whether, on the facts found, the decree below was right.
1. As to the jurisdiction.
If we understand correctly the position of the counsel for the appellants, it is precisely the same as that which occupied the attention of the court in Wiscart v. Dauchy, decided at February Term, 1796, 3 Dall. 321. There the question was, what, under the Judiciary Act of 1789, could be considered on a writ of error bringing to this court for review a decree in admiralty. The decision turned on the construction to be given the twenty-second section of the act, and Mr. Justice Wilson, in his minority opinion, said: 'Such an appeal,' that is to say, an appeal in which all the testimony is produced in this court, 'is expressly sanctioned by the Constitution; it may, therefore, clearly, in the first view of the subject, be considered as the most regular process; and as there are not any words in the judicial act restricting the power of proceeding by appeal, it must be regarded as still permitted and approved. Even, indeed, if positive restriction existed by law, it would, in my judgment, be superseded by the superior authority of the constitutional provision.' Mr. Chief Justice Ellsworth, however, who spoke for the majority of the court, said: 'If Congress has provided no rule to regulate our proceedings, we cannot exercise an appellate jurisdiction; and if the rule is provided, we cannot depart from it. The question, therefore, on the constitutional point of appellate jurisdiction, is simply whether Congress has established a rule for regulating its exercise.' And, further on: 'It is observed that a writ of error is a process more limited in its effects than an appeal; but whatever may be the operation, if an appellate jurisdiction can only be exercised by this court conformably to such regulations as are made by the Congress, and if Congress has prescribed a writ of error, and no other mode, by which it is to be exercised, still, I say, we are bound to pursue that mode, and can neither make, nor adopt, another.' And again: 'But surely it cannot be deemed a denial of justice that a man shall not be permitted to try his cause two or three times over. If he has one opportunity for the trial of all the parts of his case, justice is satisfied; and even if the decision of the Circuit Court has been made final, no denial of justice can be imputed to out government; much less can the imputation be fairly made, because the law directs that, in case of appeal, part shall be decided by one tribunal and part by another,-the facts by the court below, and the law by this court. Such a distribution of jurisdiction has long been established in England.'