In the fourth place, to the practical mind will appeal his denunciation of all elaborate plans, because _Time_ is required for all elaborate combinations, and Time is just the one thing that an active enemy will not give us,--and his consequent deduction that all plans must be of the simplest possible form. His famous sentence, "_In war all things are simple, but the simple are difficult_,"[4] gives the key to his writings, for to _overcome those simple yet great difficulties he regards as the art of war_, which can only be done by the military virtues of perseverance, energy, and boldness.

In the fifth place he does not want men to be bookworms, for he says:

The Reality of War — Part 8

"_Theory is nothing but rational reflection upon all the situations in which we can be placed in war_."[5] And we can all reflect, without reading too many books. Also he says: "Much reading of history is not required for the above object. The knowledge of a few separate battles, _in their details_, is more useful than a general knowledge of several campaigns. On this account it is more useful to read detailed narratives and journals than regular works of history."[6] He wants history in detail, not a general smattering and a loose application thereof, which fault he strongly denounces. And he expressly states that the history of the very latest war is the most useful. All of which is very practical, and in accord with what we feel to be true.

The Reality of War — Part 8

As he pictures war, "_the struggle between the spiritual and moral forces_ on _both_ sides is the centre of all,"[7] and to this aspect of the subject he gives much more attention than Jomini and most of Jomini's disciples. He has freed us once for all from all formalism. The formation of character, careful, practical, detailed study, and thorough preparation in peace, the simplest plans carried out with the utmost perseverance, resolution, energy, and boldness in war--these are the practical fruits of his teaching.

The Reality of War — Part 8

Therefore, I say again, that I do not think that the British officer could possibly find a more interesting or a better guide for the main stem of his reading than Clausewitz, nor any one that will appeal to his practical instincts of what is _True_ half so well. I do not believe that he could possibly do better than with Clausewitz as main stem, and a detailed study of the latest campaigns and modern technicalities as the up-to-date addition required to transform knowledge into action. I trust that every reader of Clausewitz will agree with me in this.