My Lords, I have now done with this first part,--namely, the presumption arising from his refusal to make any defence, on pretence that the charge brought against him might be referred to a court of justice, and from the non-performance of his promise to give satisfaction to his employers,--and when that pretence was removed, still refusing to give that satisfaction, though suffering as he did under a load of infamy and obloquy, and though urged to give it by persons of the greatest character. I have stated this to your Lordships as the strongest presumption of guilt, and that this presumption is strengthened by the very excuse which he fabricated for a part of his bribes, when he knew that the proof of them was irresistible, and that this excuse is a high aggravation of his guilt,--that this excuse is not supported by law, that it is not supported by reason, that it does not stand with his covenant, but carries with it a manifest proof of corruption, and that it cannot be justified by any principle, custom, or usage whatever. My Lords, I say I have done with the presumption arising from his conduct as it regarded the fact specifically charged against him, and with respect to the relation he stood in to the Court of Directors, and from the attempt he made to justify that conduct. I believe your Lordships will think both one and the other strong presumptions of his criminality, and of his knowledge that the act he was doing was criminal.