XX. Pompeius having spent most of his own property and applied it to the purposes of the war, demanded money of the senate, and said that he would come to Italy with his army if they did not send it. Lucullus, who was then consul, being at variance with Pompeius, and intriguing to get the command in the Mithridatic war for himself, bestirred himself to get money sent for fear of letting Pompeius have a reason for leaving Sertorius, and attacking Mithridates, which he wished to do, for Mithridates was considered to be an opponent whom it would be an honour to oppose and easy to vanquish. In the meantime, Sertorius[225] was assassinated by his friends, of whom Perpenna was the chief leader, and he attempted to do what Sertorius had done, having indeed the same troops and means, but not equal judgment for the management of them. Now Pompeius immediately advanced against Perpenna, and perceiving that he was floundering in his affairs, he sent down ten cohorts into the plain, as a bait, and gave them orders to disperse as if they were flying. When Perpenna had attacked the cohorts, and was engaged in the pursuit, Pompeius appeared in full force, and joining battle, gave the enemy a complete defeat. Most of the officers fell in the battle; but Perpenna was brought to Pompeius, who ordered him to be put to death, in which he did not show any ingratitude, nor that he had forgotten what had happened in Sicily, as some say, but he displayed great prudence and a judgment that was advantageous to the commonweal. For Perpenna, who had got possession of the writings of Sertorins, offered to produce letters from the most powerful men in Rome, who being desirous to disturb the present settlement and to change the constitution, invited Sertorius to Italy. Now Pompeius, apprehending that this might give rise to greater wars than those which were just ended, put Perpenna to death, and burnt the letters without even reading them.
XXI. After staying[226] long enough to extinguish the chief disturbances, and to quiet and settle those affairs which were in the most inflammatory state, he led his army back to Italy, and happened to arrive at the time when the servile war[227] was at its height. This was the reason why Crassus the commander urged on the hazard of a battle, which he gained, with the slaughter of twelve thousand three hundred of the enemy. Fortune, however, in a manner adopted Pompeius into this success also, for five thousand men who escaped from the battle fell in his way, all of whom he destroyed, and he took the opportunity of writing first to the senate, to say that Crassus indeed had conquered the gladiators in a pitched battle, but he had pulled up the war by the roots. And this was agreeable to the Romans to hear, owing to their good-will towards Pompeius, and also to speak of. As to Iberia and Sertorius, no one even in jest would have said that the conquest was due to any one else than Pompeius. But though the man was in such repute, and such expectations were entertained of him, there was still some suspicion and fear that he would not disband his army, but would make his way by arms and sovereign power straight to the polity of Sulla. Accordingly, those who through fear ran to greet him on the way, were as many as those who did it from good-will. But when Pompeius had removed this suspicion also by declaring that he would disband his army after the triumph, there still remained one subject of reproach for those who envied him, that he attached himself more to the people than to the senate, and that he had determined to restore the authority of the tribunate, which Sulla had destroyed, and to court the favour of the many, which was true. For there was nothing for which the people were more madly passionate, and nothing which they more desired, than to see that magistracy again, so that Pompeius considered the opportunity for this political measure a great good fortune, as he could not have found any other favour by which to requite the good-will of the citizens, if another had anticipated him in this.