19. I have heard of no malversations in office which have been of any consequence, unless we consider as such some factious transactions in the Pennsylvania Assembly; or some acts of the Virginia Assembly which have been contrary to their constitution. The causes of these were explained in the preceding article.
20. Broils among the States may happen in the following ways: 1. A State may be embroiled with the other twelve by not complying with the lawful requisitions of Congress. 2. Two States may differ about their boundaries. But the method of settling these is fixed by the confederation, and most of the States which have any differences of this kind, are submitting them to this mode of determination, and there is no danger of opposition to the decree by any State. The individuals interested may complain, but this can produce no difficulty. 3. Other contestations may arise between two States, such as pecuniary demands, affrays among their citizens, and whatever else may arise between any two nations, with respect to these, there are two opinions. One that they are to be decided according to the ninth article of the confederation, which says that Congress shall be the last resort in all differences between two or more States, concerning boundary jurisdiction, _or any other cause whatever_; and prescribes the mode of decision, and the weight of reason is undoubtedly in favor of this opinion, yet there are some who question it.
It has been often said that the decisions of Congress are impotent because the confederation provides no compulsory power. But when two or more nations enter into compact, it is not usual for them to say what shall be done to the party who infringes it. Decency forbids this, and it is as unnecessary as indecent, because the right of compulsion naturally results to the party injured by the breach. When any one State in the American Union refuses obedience to the confederation by which they have bound themselves, the rest have a natural right to compel them to obedience. Congress would probably exercise long patience before they would recur to force; but if the case ultimately required it, they would use that recurrence. Should this case ever arise, they will probably coerce by a naval force, as being more easy, less dangerous to liberty, and less likely to produce much bloodshed.