THIS case was brought up by writ of error from the Circuit Court of the United States for the district of Maryland.
It was an action on the case for libel brought by Quigley against the railroad company, under the circumstances which are fully set forth in the opinion of the court, which also contains the instructions of the Circuit Court to the jury.
The case was argued by Mr. Schley and Mr. Donaldson for the plaintiffs in error, and Mr. Johnson and Mr. Davis for the defendant.
The counsel for the plaintiffs in error made the following points:
1. An action of libel cannot be sustained against the plaintiff in error. The laws, under which it exists as a corporate body, are a part of the record. It is a railroad company, with defined and limited faculties and powers; and it can exercise no incidental powers, except such as are necessary to the full exercise of the faculties and powers expressly given by its charter. Being a mere legal entity, it is incapable of malice; and in the very definition of libel, malice is an essential element. The action should have been instituted against the natural persons, who published the alleged libel.
Rex v. The Great North of England Railway Co., 9 Q. B., 315.
Stevens v. Midland Counties Railway Co., 10 Exchequer, 352.
Commonwealth v. The Proprietors of New Bedford Bridge, 2 Gray, 345.
State v. Great Works Mill and Man. Co., 20 Maine, 41.
McClelland v. Bank of Cumberland, 24 Maine, 566.
Childs v. Bank of Missouri, 17 Missouri, 213.
And, for illustration, the cases of Colman v. The Eastern Counties Railway Co., 4 Railway C., 513, and Salomons v. Lainy, 6 Railway C., 301, are referred to, showing that the corporation is not bound by acts of directors, when such acts are ultra vires.
2. Even if the action of libel could be maintained against the plaintiff in error, in a case of unlawful publication, yet, upon the proof in this case, there was no such publication.
The communication, by the president and directors to the stockholders, of the results of the investigation into the conduct of the company's officers, was a privileged communication; and even if it amounted to a publication, no action will lie, unless upon proof of express malice and the want of probable cause; and the burden of proving malice and want of probable cause was on the plaintiff below.
Van Dyck v. Guthrie, 4 Duer, 268.
Vanderzee v. McGregor, 12 Wend., 545.
Davison v. Duncan, 40 Law and E. Rep., 219.
Shipley v. Todhunter, 7 Carr and Payne, 680; 32 Eng. C. L. Rep., 685.
Somerville v. Hawkins, 10 C. B., 583; 70 Eng. C. L. Rep., 583.
Taylor v. Hawkins, 16 Q. B., 308; 71 Eng. C. L. Rep., 307.
Harris v. Thompson, 13 C. B., 333; 76 Eng. C. L. Rep., 333.
Cockayne v. Hodgkinson, 5 Carr and Payne, 543; 24 Eng. C. L. Rep., 448.
Toogood v. Spyring, 1 Cr. Mees. and Ros., 181.
Padmore v. Lawrence, 11 Ad. and El., 380, 39 Eng. C. L. Rep., 115.
Howard v. Thompson, 21 Wend., 320.
Bradley v. Heath, 12 Pick., 163.
Hopwood v. Thorn, 8 Mann., Grang., and Scott, 315; 65 Eng. C. L. Rep., 291.
White v. Nicholls, 3 How., 266.
Cooke v. Wilde, 30 Law and E. Rep.
3. But there was no evidence of publication, by the defendant, of the matter complained of as libellous. The report of the president and directors to the stockholders of the company, communicating the results of the investigation, was no such publication; and the adoption of their report, and the consequent printing of the testimony, and its authorized distribution amongst the stockholders, was no such publication.
Rex v. Baillie, 2 Esp. N. P., 10, and cited in Howard v. Thompson, 21 Wend.
4. There was no evidence of express malice on the part of the corporation, or on the part of the board of directors, or on the part of the stockholders. It is not a case in which vindictive damages could properly be given.
2 Greenl. Ev., secs. 253, 420.
Day v. Woodworth, 13 How., 371.
5. The first instruction of the court below was erroneous in several particulars. It directed the jury that they might infer malice, from the mere falsehood of any statement in the letter of Mahoney, respecting the plaintiff in his trade and occupation; and that the distribution of the printed book, among any of the stockholders, rendered the defendant liable in the action. The defendant, under this instruction, was not at liberty to claim a verdict, except upon proof of the truth of every statement in said letter; for the distribution of the book, to some extent, amongst the stockholders, was not denied.