In the Argentine the position of the patriot government was even worse. With civil war actively raging in the one country and only held in check by foreign bayonets in the other, and with both governments struggling against financial difficulties, it is no wonder that the war-ships which were expected to sweep the Spanish frigates from the Pacific did not arrive. The delay cost the patriots dear. In January, 1818, four Spanish ships, mounting two hundred and thirty cannon sailed into Talcahuano, and landed three thousand four hundred well-equipped soldiers, most of them peninsular veterans. San Martin, a master of the art of recruiting, had raised a second army composed principally of Chileans and nearly equal in numbers to the original Army of the Andes, so that his total force amounted to nine thousand men, while the Spanish troops did not exceed five thousand. The Argentine general was in the dark as to where the enemy would land, and had already issued orders for O'Higgins, who was in command near Concepcion, to retreat, resolved on concentrating his forces near Valparaiso. Even after the Spanish army had disembarked at Talcahuano, San Martin was in doubt whether Osorio would not re-embark and strike at some unexpected harbour near Santiago. But the latter came up steadily by the land route, encountering no opposition though somewhat hampered by broken bridges and the bareness of the country of horses and supplies, for the retreating O'Higgins had left his track a desert. The farther the Spaniards penetrated toward Santiago the more difficult became the feeding of their army and the more certainly disastrous a retreat in case of reverse.