The Bar Lev Line (, Kav Bar Lev; , Khaṭṭ Barlīf) was a chain of fortifications built by Israel along the eastern bank of the Suez Canal after it occupied the Sinai Peninsula from Egypt during the 1967 Six-Day War. It was considered impenetrable by the Israelis until it was overrun during 1973's Operation Badr in less than two hours by the Egyptian military led by Chief of staff Saad El Shazly.
History
The Bar Lev Line evolved from a group of rudimentary fortifications placed along the canal line. In response to Egyptian artillery bombardments during the War of Attrition, Israel developed the fortifications into an elaborate defense system spanning along Suez Canal, with the exception of the Great Bitter Lake (where a canal crossing was unlikely due to the width of the lake). The Bar Lev Line was designed to defend against any major Egyptian assault across the canal, and was expected to function as a "graveyard for Egyptian troops".
The line, costing around $300 million in 1973, was named after Israeli Chief of Staff Haim Bar-Lev. The line was built at the Suez Canal, a unique water barrier that Moshe Dayan described as "one of the best anti-tank ditches in the world." The line incorporated a massive, continuous sand wall lining the entire canal, and was supported by a concrete wall. The sand wall, which varied in height from , was inclined at an angle of 45–65 degrees. The sand wall and its concrete support prevented any armored or amphibious units from landing on the east bank of the Suez Canal without prior engineering preparations. Israeli planners estimated it would take at least 24 hours, probably a full 48 hours for the Egyptians to breach the sand wall and establish a bridge across the canal.
Immediately behind this sand wall was the front line of Israeli fortifications. After the War of Attrition, there were 22 forts, which incorporated 35 strongpoints. The forts were designed to be manned by a platoon. The strongpoints, which were built several stories into the sand, were on average situated less than from each other, but at likely crossing points they were less than apart. The strongpoints incorporated trenches, minefields, barbed wire and a sand embankment. Major strongpoints had up to 26 bunkers with medium and heavy machineguns, 24 troop shelters, six mortar positions, four bunkers housing anti-aircraft weapons, and three firing positions for tanks. The strongpoints were surrounded by nearly fifteen circles of barbed wire and minefields to a depth of . A strongpoint's perimeter averaged . The bunkers and shelters provided protection against anything less than a 500 kg bomb, and offered luxuries to the defenders such as air conditioning. Between behind the canal, there were prepared firing positions designed to be occupied by tanks assigned to the support of the strongpoints. Some of the names of the strongpoints were Tasa, Maftzach, Milano, Mezach, Chizayon, Mifreket, Orcal, Budapest (the largest), Nisan, Lituf, Chashiva. In addition, there were eleven strongholds located behind the canal, which were built along sandy hills. Each stronghold was designed to hold a company of troops.
To take advantage of the water obstacle, the Israelis installed an underwater pipe system to pump flammable crude oil into the Suez Canal, thereby creating a sheet of flame. Some Israeli sources claim the system was unreliable and only a few of the taps were operational. Nevertheless, the Egyptians took this threat seriously and, on the eve of the war, during the late evening of 5 October, teams of Egyptian frogmen blocked the underwater openings with concrete.
Defensive plans
To support the Bar Lev Line, Israel built a well-planned and elaborate system of roads. Three main roads ran north–south. The first was the Lexicon Road (Infantry Road), running along the canal, which allowed the Israelis to move between the fortifications and conduct patrols. The second was the Artillery Road, around from the canal. Its name came from the twenty artillery and air defense positions located on it; it also linked armored concentration areas and logistical bases. The Lateral Road (Supply Road), from the canal, was meant to allow the concentration of Israeli operational reserves which, in case of an Egyptian offensive, would counterattack the main Egyptian assault. A number of other roads running east to west, Quantara Road, Hemingway Road, and Jerusalem Road were designed to facilitate the movement of Israeli troops towards the canal.