_He must decide the position_, and to some extent the action, of the Cavalry. Before defensive action in a War of Manoeuvre the cavalry have been out on reconnaissance, and during the early stages they have endeavoured to lure the assailants on to a false position. During the battle they will frustrate the efforts of opposing mounted troops, will protect a vulnerable flank, and will assist generally by dismounted fire action. After the victorious counter-attack they will emerge in pursuit. In case of a reverse they will delay the enemy's victorious advance by fire action and by mounted tactics to protect the withdrawing forces from the depredations of hostile cavalry. A position near a flank will usually be occupied.

There have been many examples of protection by cavalry of a force that has been worsted. After the _Combat of Roliça_ (August 17, 1808) General Delaborde retreated by alternate masses, protecting his movements by short, vigorous charges of cavalry. At _Chancellorsville_ (May 3, 1863), and on the first day of _Gettysburg_ (July 1, 1863), a handful of United States { 96} cavalry held up the pursuit and staved off disaster. At _Königgratz_ (_Sadowa_), (July 3, 1866), the charges of the Austrian cavalry drove back the Prussian Horse and enabled Benedek's defeated troops to get back in safety. At _Rezonville_ (August 16, 1870) von Bredow's Cavalry Brigade was ordered to charge the French batteries and their infantry escort, in order to give some breathing time for the hard-pressed Prussian infantry. The charge was successful and the time was gained, but as at _Balaclava_ (October 26, 1854) there were few survivors from "Von Bredow's Todtenritt" (death ride). After the battle of _Le Cateau_ (August 26, 1918) and during the _Retreat from Mons_, the British cavalry, under General Allenby, effectively held off the enemy and enabled the British troops to move unmolested. During the great German offensive in the spring of 1918 the withdrawal of the troops at _Cugny_ (March 24, 1918) was made possible by a brilliant mounted charge by a squadron of the 16th Cavalry Brigade, which broke through the German line, taking over 100 prisoners, and sabring a large number of the enemy. During the retreat in that area units of the 2nd and 3rd Cavalry Divisions proved so effective in delaying the enemy's advance that other units were horsed during the progress of the battle in order to increase the supply of cavalry. "Without the assistance of mounted troops, skilfully handled and gallantly led, the enemy could scarcely have been prevented from breaking through the long and thinly held front of broken and wooded ground before the French reinforcements had had time to arrive. . . . The absence of hostile cavalry at this period was a marked feature of the battle. Had the German command had at their disposal even two or three well-trained cavalry divisions, a wedge might have been driven between the French and British Armies. Their presence could not have failed to have added greatly to the difficulties of our task" (Sir D. Haig's Dispatches).

Lectures on Land Warfare; A tactical Manual for the Use of Infantry Officers — Part 69