Freight charges were collected by a railroad carrier in accordance with an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission after the refusal of a United States District Court to declare the order void. Later the decree was reversed by this court without considering the evidence on the ground that the findings of the Commission were incomplete and inadequate. Florida v. United States, 282 U.S. 194, 51 S.Ct. 119, 75 L.Ed. 291. Still later the Commission upon new evidence and new findings made the same order it had made before; this court confirming its action after appropriate proceedings. Florida v. United States, 292 U.S. 1, 54 S.Ct. 603, 78 L.Ed. 1077. The question now is whether restitution is owing from the carrier for the whole or any part of the rates collected from its customers while the first order was in force. The narrative must be expanded to bring us to an answer.
For many years, beginning with 1903, the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company or its predecessor maintained a schedule of charges known as the Cummer scale for the transportation of logs in train and carload shipments within the state of Florida. In its inception this scale was established by agreement between the railroad company and one or more companies engaged in the sale of lumber. Later, in January, 1927, an order was made by the Railroad Commission of Florida whereby voluntary rates then in force, if not higher than the maximum rates approved by the Commission, were to be continued in effect as if officially prescribed. For the purpose of the present controversy, we assume that, by force of this order, the Cummer scale, even though less than compensatory, and even though voidable through appropriate action, must be deemed to have been fixed by law for intrastate transactions.
In May, 1926, the Public Service Commission of Georgia filed a complaint against the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company with the Interstate Commerce Commission; the complaint being directed to the maintenance of the Cummer scale. In that proceeding the Railroad Commission of Florida intervened, and also important shippers affected by the challenged schedule. On August 2, 1928, the Interstate Commerce Commission made a decision (146 I.C.C. 717), amended and broadened on February 7, 1929, enjoining the maintenance of the schedule then in force on the ground (along with others) that the rates were so low as to result in unjust discrimination against interstate commerce. To avoid this discrimination, a new schedule was established. Florida and the intervening shippers brought suits in a federal District Court, made up of three judges in accordance with the statute (28 U.S.C. § 47 (28 USCA § 47)), to vacate the orders of the Commission and restrain enforcement. The District Court dismissed the bills. 30 F.(2d) 116; Id. (D.C.) 31 F.(2d) 580. Upon appeal to this court the decrees were reversed on the ground that the report of the Commission did not contain the necessary findings. 282 U.S. 194, 51 S.Ct. 119, 75 L.Ed. 291. It was not enough to find that the intrastate rates were unreasonably low. 282 U.S. 194, at page 214, 51 S.Ct. 119, 75 L.Ed. 291. It was not enough to state the conclusion that interstate commerce was unjustly affected. 282 U.S. 194, at page 213, 51 S.Ct. 119, 75 L.Ed. 291. It was necessary to find the facts supporting the conclusion, as, for instance, that the revenues of interstate commerce would probably be increased if the rates for intrastate hauls were established at a higher level. 'In the absence of such findings, we are not called upon to examine the evidence in order to resolve opposing contentions as to what it shows or to spell out and state such conclusions of fact as it may permit.' 282 U.S. 194, at page 215, 51 S.Ct. 119, 125, 75 L.Ed. 291. The Commission was to be free, however, to consider the facts anew and file its report in proper form. It 'is still at liberty, acting in accordance with the authority conferred by the statute, to make such determinations as the situation may require.' The mandate of reversal, giving effect to that decision, went down from this court on February 19, 1931, and on March 7, 1931 was filed in the court below.