The Donbas–Rostov Strategic Defensive Operation (September 29 – November 16, 1941) was a defensive operation of the Southern Front and the left wing of the South–Western Front of the Red Army on the territory of Donbas during the World War II. During it, the Donbas and Rostov front–line defensive operations were carried out.
Forces of the parties
By the end of September 1941, the approaches to Donbas were defended by: Southern Front (Commander Lieutenant General Dmitry Ryabyshev, from October 5 – Colonel General Yakov Cherevichenko): 12th Army (Soviet Union) (Commanded by Major General Ivan Galanin); 18th Army (Soviet Union) (Commanded by Lieutenant General Andrei Smirnov, since October Major General Vladimir Kolpakchi); 9th Army (Soviet Union) (Commanded by Lieutenant General Fyodor Kharitonov). Left Wing of the Southwestern Front (Marshal of the Soviet Union Semyon Timoshenko): 6th Army (Commanded by Lieutenant General Rodion Malinovsky). Azov Military Flotilla (Commander 1st Rank Captain Alexander Alexandrov, from October 1941 – Rear Admiral Sergey Gorshkov).
The general leadership of the troops was carried out by the Commander–in–Chief of the troops of the South–West direction, Marshal of the Soviet Union Semyon Timoshenko. These troops included 23 rifle divisions, 5 cavalry divisions, 6 tank brigades, and 1 fortified area.
The opposing forces of the Wehrmacht – the troops of Army Group South (Commanded by General Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt): 17th Army (Commanded by Colonel General Carl von Stülpnagel); 1st Panzer Group, from October 6 – 1st Panzer Army (Commanded by Colonel General Ewald von Kleist); 11th Army (General of the Infantry Erich von Manstein); 3rd Romanian Army (Commander Petre Dumitrescu); Italian Expeditionary Corps in Russia (Commanded by General Giovanni Messe); Mobile Corps (Hungary) (Commanded by Major General Béla Miklós).
They consisted of 18 infantry divisions, 3 tank divisions, 10 different brigades. The Romanian, Italian and Hungarian troops were operatively subordinate to the commanders of those German armies in which they operated.
The superiority in favor of the German and allied troops was 2 times in people, 2 times in aviation, 3 times in artillery and mortars.
Previous events and plans of the parties
By the end of September 1941, during the Tiraspol–Melitopol Defensive Operation, Soviet troops were thrown back with heavy losses to the Milk Estuary – Nikopol – Zaporozhye – Dnepropetrovsk – Krasnograd line, where they put themselves in order and built defensive lines. Their total number was 541,600 people. By the directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command of September 22, 1941, they were ordered to create a stable defense and allocate reserves. But even in this situation, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command demanded active offensive actions from the front. Fulfilling these requirements, virtually all the armies of the front carried out private offensive operations at the end of September, with very limited or no success, but with significant losses.
The German command planned to deliver the main deep dissecting blow with the forces of the 1st Tank Group from the area north of Dnepropetrovsk in the direction of the Azov Sea (to the city of Osipenko). An auxiliary blow was delivered by the 11th German (from the Nikopol Area) and the 3rd Romanian Army (along the coast of the Azov Sea). Having united, these groups were supposed to destroy the main forces of the Southern Front. The 17th Army provided the flank of the advancing strike group, with the task of defeating the 6th Soviet Army. After the destruction of the Southern Front, German troops were to develop an offensive against Voroshilovgrad (17th Army) and Rostov–on–Don (1st Panzer Group). In favor of the German troops were the general superiority in forces and equipment, as well as the skillful concentration of the most mobile and trained forces in the direction of the main attack (practically the entire 1st Tank Group – 350 tanks – went on the offensive on a front of only 25 kilometers). Soviet intelligence was unable to establish the concentration of the 1st Tank Group in this sector, so the blow of this entire armada fell on the positions of two rifle divisions, staffed after previous battles by less than 50% personnel and practically without artillery.