The Hessian detachment was reinforced to a strength of three battalions, four squadrons and six guns, but was nevertheless driven back to Gien on the 1st of January. The French had displayed a force of several thousand Gardes-Mobiles, twelve guns, and a body of marine infantry. A noticeable fact was that some of the prisoners brought in belonged to the XVIIIth French Corps, which formed part of the Ist Army of the Loire.
A regiment of the 6th Cavalry Division sent out to reconnoitre into the Sologne, returned with the report that strong hostile columns were marching on Aubigny Ville. On the other hand, two waggon-drivers who had been taken prisoners declared that the French troops had been already moved from Bourges by rail, and the newspaper reports also pointed to the same conclusion; still, too much weight could not be attached to mere rumour as against circumstantial intelligence. It was therefore assumed at Versailles that the Ist Army of the Loire was still about Bourges, and that General Bourbaki, when again in a condition to fight, would act in concert with General Chanzy.

The two armies might attack the Germans at Orleans from opposite sides, or one might engage and detain them there, while the other marched to relieve the capital.

This, in fact, was what General Chanzy had in view. Since the 21st of December he had been resting in quarters in and about Le Mans, where railways from four directions facilitated the bringing up of new levies. His troops had no doubt great hardships to contend with there. In lack of shelter for such great masses part had to camp out under canvas in the snow, and suffered severely from the intense cold. The hospitals were crammed with wounded and small-pox patients. On the other hand, this close concentration was favourable to the reorganization of the details and the restoration of discipline; and the news from Paris urged the General to renewed action.

General Trochu had sent word that Paris unaided could not accomplish her freedom. Even if a sortie should prove successful, the necessary supplies for the maintenance of an army could not be carried with it, and therefore nothing but the simultaneous appearance of an army from without could meet the case. Now General Chanzy was quite ready to march on Paris, but it was indispensable that he should first know exactly what Generals Bourbaki and Faidherbe were doing.





