I asked General Botha why he did not concentrate all the forces in the field, so that he could make some decided stands. He answered: “We have talked the matter well over, and have made a definite form of campaign for the remaining portion of the war. Should we gather all our fighting men together into one force we could undoubtedly make some very pretty fights; but there would be only a few of them, for with the overwhelming force against us they could soon surround any position we could take, and there would be an end to our cause. As it is, we will split up into four or five commands, continue operations independently of each other, but keep absolutely in touch, and confer on the general plan of campaign at all times. It took your colonial troops seven years of that sort of work to gain independence against the same country, and we can do the same thing. We can fight seven years without being crushed, and should we gain our independence at the end of that time we would consider the time well spent.”
General Botha pointed to the facts that his troops were in better condition and had greater resources than Washington’s ever had; that there was more accord among his burghers than there was among the American colonial troops; and that, more important still, the entire population of the country was in absolute sympathy with the cause. This shows why a campaign can develop into what the British call guerrilla warfare and still be a part of a splendid strategical plan. In my mind, the operations in South Africa cannot be called guerrilla warfare so long as the Boer commands of 3,000 or 4,000 men move on regular marches, with heavy and light artillery, baggage-trains, and assisted by signal corps. From these commands small detachments are sent out for the various duties of blowing up a bridge or a culvert, attacking a force sufficiently small in number, or capturing a supply train. All of these operations are done under a system of regular order, and are not, as the British reports would lead us to believe, the work of mere bands of robbers or outlaws.
The strategy shown in these movements, and, in the main, the tactics and their execution, have been of a superlative order, although not developed from military text-books, but rather from the natural brain of a lion-hunter. It is to be regretted that more of the movements have not been chronicled, so that the military world might have been benefited by a study of these operations.