But the 'end' in view which General von Bernhardi has so clearly laid down must never be lost sight of.
Whilst the conditions of modern War have rendered the service of reconnaissance far more difficult, the same causes lend themselves to a much easier deception of the enemy by means of feints, etc. Cavalry, when working with the other Arms, can render valuable service in this way, and also in bringing rapid support to a main or counter attack.
Another most important point must be noticed. I allude to the increasing tendency of umpires and superior officers to insist on Cavalry at manoeuvres and elsewhere being _ultra-cautious_. They try to inculcate such a respect for Infantry fire that Cavalry is taught to shirk exposure, and the moment Infantry come within sight, squadrons are made either to retire altogether, or dismount and shoot, regardless of what the 'Cavalry value' of the ground happens to be.
I have no hesitation in saying that immense harm is done to the war efficiency of Cavalry by decisions of this kind, which disregard altogether the human factor in the problem. We ought the more to be on our guard against false teaching of this nature, seeing that there are many grave warnings to be found in history of the inevitable consequences of thus placing the weapon above the men.
After the war of 1866 the great von Moltke made the following report to the King of Prussia:--
'Our Cavalry failed, perhaps not so much in actual capacity as in _self-confidence_. All its initiative had been destroyed at manoeuvres, where criticism and blame had become almost synonymous, and it therefore shirked independent bold action, and kept far in rear, and as much as possible out of sight' (Moltke's 'Taktisch-Strategische Aufsätze,' Berlin, 1900).
By like methods in peace training prior to the War with Turkey such timidity had been developed in the Russian Cavalry that, in the words of General Baykow, Cavalry commanders showed a marked disinclination to undertake operations which were well within their powers, but which might bring them in contact with the Turkish Infantry, and so run risk of suffering loss.
History is full of similar instances of how _not_ to train Cavalry, and I hold most strongly that the Arm must be educated up to a readiness _to act_, to come to close quarters in co-operation with the other Arms, and to risk casualties, as Infantry has often done before without losing its 'battle' value.