[55] _Elements of Morality_, Book i. chap. ii. At the same time, it is also true--as I afterwards say--that we sometimes identify ourselves with passion or appetite in conscious conflict with reason: and then the rule of reason is apt to appear an external constraint, and obedience to it a servitude, if not a slavery.

[56] The difficulty which Socrates and the Socratic schools had in conceiving a man to choose deliberately what he knows to be bad for him--a difficulty which drives Aristotle into real Determinism in his account of purposed action, even while he is expressly maintaining the “voluntariness” and “responsibility” of vice--seems to be much reduced for the modern mind by the distinction between moral and prudential judgments, and the _prima facie_ conflict between ‘interest’ and ‘duty.’ Being thus familiar with the conception of deliberate choice consciously opposed _either_ to interest _or_ to duty, we can without much difficulty conceive of such choice in conscious opposition to both. See chap. ix. § 3, of this Book.

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[57] It is most convenient to regard “intention” as including not only such results of volition as the agent _desired_ to realise, but also any that, without desiring, he foresaw as certain or probable. The question how far we are responsible for all the foreseen consequences of our acts, or, in the case of acts prescribed by definite moral rules, only for their results within a certain range, will be considered when we come to examine the Intuitional Method.

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[58] In a subsequent chapter (chap. ix. of this Book) I shall examine more fully the relation of the antithesis ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ to the vaguer and wider antithesis ‘good’ and ‘bad,’ in our practical reasonings.

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[59] It is not uncommon for Determinists to conceive of each volition as connected by uniform laws with our past state of consciousness. But any uniformities we might trace among a man’s past consciousnesses, even if we knew them all, would yet give us very imperfect guidance as to his future action: as there would be left out of account--

(1) All inborn tendencies and susceptibilities, as yet latent or incompletely exhibited;

(2) All past physical influences, of which the effects had not been perfectly represented in consciousness.