The English surveillance had assumed dimensions that would not have been possible without the tacit connivance, which at times became active support, of the American authorities. Not only did the English consuls demand that in each individual case the bills of lading should be submitted to them, but in addition to this an efficient surveillance and spy service was organized, partly by American detective bureaus and partly by a separate and wide-reaching service. The English had confidential agents in all the shipping offices, whose services had for the most part been acquired by bribery. At various times attempts were made to break into Herr Albert's office, to learn the combination for opening his safe, to get hold of papers through the charwomen and other employees, and even to rob him personally of papers. The control of the American port authorities was within the letter of the law, but in practice it worked very unfavorably to us. The regulation was that ship and cargo must be consigned to a definite port. This regulation was drawn up purely for purposes of statistics, and consequently no importance was attached to it before the war. As a rule the bills of lading were filled in by subordinate employees of the exporter. Soon after the outbreak of the war a special "neutrality squad" was attached to the "Collector of the Port of New York" whose duty it was to maintain strict neutrality by seeing that the said laws were properly observed. This led, in cases where there was a suspicion that the cargo was not intended for the given port of destination, but for Germany, to an exhaustive inquiry. This measure could not fail to act as a deterrent, and even Herr Albert was seriously hampered in his enterprises. The whole system amounted to a complement of the English blockade. When Herr Albert finally succeeded in coming to an agreement with the Customs authorities in this matter a great number of opportunities had been missed and the shipments had been made practically impossible by the tightening of the English blockade.
There was no question of entrusting the shipping to American exporters who had had long experience of German trade. Herr Albert from the first considered it advisable to interfere as little as possible with the existing business relations between the two countries, and he left it to the firms trading with Germany to carry through their commissions as best they could. This method of supplying Germany with food, however, completely failed. The fault also lies partly with the importers in Germany. In these circles it was for a long time hoped, but in vain, to obtain consignments from American firms. Further, they clung too long to the business methods of peace, demanded estimates, bargained about prices, and, most important of all, did not realize that the risk to the exporter as a result of the English blockade made special compensation or payment necessary. In consequence the valuable time at the beginning of the war was lost. Very soon, however, the American exporters withdrew completely, because those who had had previous business relations with Germany were known to the English, and so were suspected and finally placed on the black list. A shipment by one of these firms would then at once have been marked down as destined for Germany, and would have run risk of capture. Herr Albert, therefore, made use of special agencies. At first, in addition to employing Danish firms, he founded several new American export companies. These new organizations were of course only available for a short time, and, as soon as they came under English suspicion and were consequently rendered useless, had to be replaced by others.