§3 (2). The situation after the Council of Nicæa.
council (a) had
testified, by its horrified and spontaneous rejection of it, that
Arianism was a novelty subversive of the Christian faith as they had
received it from their fathers. They had (b) banished it from the
Church by an inexorable test, which even the leading supporters of
Arius had been induced to subscribe. In the years immediately
following, we find (c) a large majority of the Eastern bishops, especially of Syria and Asia Minor, the very regions whence the numerical strength of the council was drawn, in full reaction against the council; first against the leaders of the victorious party, eventually and for nearly a whole generation against the symbol itself; the final victory of the latter in the East being the result of the slow growth of conviction, a growth independent of the authority of the council which it eventually was led to recognise. To understand this paradox of history, which determines the whole story of the life of Athanasius as bishop, it is necessary to estimate at some length the theological and ecclesiastical situation at the close of the council: this will best be done by examining each point in turn (a) the novelty of Arianism, (b) the ὁμοούσιον as a theological formula, (c) the materials for reaction.
(a) ‘Arianism was a new doctrine in the
Church’ (Harnack, p. 218); but it claimed to be no novelty. And
it was successful for a long time in gaining ‘conservative’
patronage. Its novelty, as observed above, is sufficiently shewn by its
reception at the Council of Nicæa. But no novelty springs into
existence without antecedents. What were the antecedents of Arianism? How does it stand related to the history within the Church of the momentous question, ‘What think ye of Christ?’
In examining such a question, two methods are
possible. We may take as our point of departure the formulated dogma
say of Nicæa, and examine in the light of it variations in
theological statements in preceding periods, to shew that they do not
warrant us in regarding the dogma as an innovation. That is the
dogmatic method. Or we may take our start from the beginning, and trace
the history of doctrine in the order of cause and effect, so as to
detect the divergence and convergence of streams of influence, and
arrive at an answer to the question, How came men to think and speak as
they did? That is the historical method. Both methods have their
recommendations, and either has been ably applied to the problem before
us. In electing the latter I choose the more difficult road; but I do
so with the conviction, firstly, that the former has tended (and
especially in the ablest hands) to obscure our perception of the actual
facts, secondly, that the saving faith of Christ has everything to gain
from a method which appeals directly to our sense of historical truth, and satisfies, not merely overawes, the mind.