Lastly, as to the tardiness of the administration of justice with us, it would be equally tedious and impracticable for me to give a precise account of it in every State. But I think it probable that it is much on the same footing through all the States, and that an account of it in any one of them may found a general presumption of it in the others. Being best acquainted with its administration in Virginia, I shall confine myself to that. Before the Revolution, a judgment could not be obtained under eight years in the supreme court, where the suit was in the department of the common law, which department embraces about nine-tenths of the subject of legal contestation. In that of the chancery, from twelve to twenty years were requisite. This did not proceed from any vice in the laws, but from the indolence of the judges appointed by the King; and these judges holding their office during his will only, he could have reformed the evil at any time. This reformation was among the first works of the legislature after our independence. A judgment can now be obtained in the supreme court in one year at the common law, and in about three years in the chancery. But more particularly to protect the commerce of France, which, at that moment, was considerable with us, a law was passed, giving all suits wherein a foreigner was a party, a privilege to be tried immediately, on the return of his process, without waiting till those of natives, which stand before them, shall have been decided on. Out of this act, however, the British stand excluded by a subsequent one. This, with its causes, must be explained. The British army, after ravaging the State of Virginia, had sent off a very great number of slaves to New York. By the seventh article of the treaty of peace, they stipulated not to carry away any of these. Notwithstanding this, it was known, when they were evacuating New York, that they were carrying away the slaves. General Washington made an official demand of Sir Guy Carleton, that he should cease to send them away. He answered, that these people had come to them under promise of the King's protection, and that that promise should be fulfilled in preference to the stipulation in the treaty. The State of Virginia, to which nearly the whole of these slaves belonged, passed a law to forbid the recovery of debts due to British subjects. They declared, at the same time, they would repeal the law, if Congress were of opinion they ought to do it. But, desirous that their citizens should be discharging their debts, they afterwards permitted British creditors to prosecute their suits, and to receive their debts in seven equal and annual payments; relying that the demand for the slaves would be either admitted or denied in time to lay their hands on some of the latter payments for reimbursement. The immensity of this debt was another reason for forbidding such a mass of property to be offered for sale under execution at once, as, from the small quantity of circulating money, it must have sold for little or nothing, whereby the creditor would have failed to receive his money, and the debtor would have lost his whole estate without being discharged of his debt. This is the history of the delay of justice in that country in the case of British creditors. As to all others, its administration is as speedy as justice itself will admit. I presume it is equally so in all the other States, and can add, that it is administered in them all, with a purity and integrity of which few counties afford an example.